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Preface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Thomas Jefferson, a man responsible for shaping so many of the ideals of the 
United States, held the notion of a free press among those most vital for the young nation. 
Indeed, printers during the American Revolution played an important role in the fight for 
independence, and this solidified freedom of the press as an integral part of the new 
republic.1 Jefferson pushed for codifying the freedom in the Bill of Rights so there would 
be no question about the right to open debate in the public sphere.2 He even saw freedom 
of the press, in newspaper form at that time, as more important for the people’s good than 
the government itself. Jefferson explained his sentiment in a letter to friend Edward 
Carrington penned in January of 1787:  
 
The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very 
first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.3 
 
Jefferson’s opinion of news’ civic importance as the people’s voice and check on 
possible government abuse rings clear; newspapers—a free press—are a critical part of a 
 2 
representative government. So it came as no surprise six years into his presidency in 
1807, when asked how to best run a newspaper by John Norvell, Jefferson again 
described news in a manner befitting its social importance: 
 
Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself 
becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle. The real extent 
of this state of misinformation is known only to those who are in situations 
to confront facts within their knowledge with the lies of the day.4 
 
Being in politics can change people like that.  
 To be fair, Jefferson included a caveat in his earlier opinion of newspapers. After 
stating a preference for newspapers without government if the other option was only 
government, he clarified, “But I should mean that every man should receive those papers 
and be capable of reading them.”5 There was the catch. It was vital for news to be both 
widespread and accessible to all citizens if newspapers were to fulfill their civic 
responsibility. And ideally not merely read, but understood by the people participating in 
government.  
 Civically perfect newspapers naturally proved to be an unrealistic ideal in 
America during Jefferson’s lifetime. The paradoxical balance between a free press and a 
responsible press made this lack of perfection unsurprising; if press is held by 
government to contribute to political discourse in a certain way then their freedom is 
limited. But giving the press freedom comes with its own challenges, which Jefferson 
experienced firsthand before his election as president. The press freely printed his private 
correspondence without consent, thus estranging his friendship with John Adams.6 The 
press freely advocated almost unilaterally for the Federalist Party.7 And the press freely 
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attacked Republican Party members and political beliefs viciously, in an attempt to 
control political discourse and the fate of the young nation.8 “Defamation” Jefferson 
continued in his letter to Mr. Norvell describing the content of newspapers, “is becoming 
a necessary of life; insomuch, that a dish of tea in the morning or evening cannot be 
digested without this stimulant.”9  
 The balance between freedom and responsibility is the ever-present question of 
America’s relationship with news media. Freedom of the press is necessary for a healthy 
check on governmental and institutional powers, but it also frees news outlets to not 
contribute to that civic discourse. And as Jefferson experienced firsthand it was, and still 
is, a challenge to reconcile these two incontrovertible realties of allowing press freedom 
in a representative government.  
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ONE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media in America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In 1831, two young Frenchmen travelled to the United States at the request of the 
French Government to study the penitentiary system. America’s prisons were unique in 
the world at that time, very much as the young nation was itself.10 But studying the 
penitentiary system actually was an excuse to make their trip “official”; both travelers 
planned to learn and write about America as a whole, a task that they hoped would 
further their burgeoning political careers in France.11 The two travelers made it clear to 
friends before they left France that they intended to write a book about “all the 
mechanisms of this vast American society.”12 The Frenchmen spent countless hours 
meeting and interviewing ordinary and famous Americans on their trip, and also read 
much American literature.13 In total they travelled seven thousand miles across what was 
then the entirety of the country.14 The two men were Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave 
de Beaumont, and their trip became internationally famous when de Tocqueville wrote an 
extensive account of their travels in a two-volume work titled Democracy in America. 
The book was so popular in France that de Tocqueville received the greatest French 
award for an intellectual: admittance into the elite Académie Française.15  
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 The impact of Democracy in America did not end in the 19th century. Far from it; 
de Tocqueville’s work is frequently quoted in political rhetoric to this day.16 Every 
president from Dwight Eisenhower to George W. Bush quoted de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America at some point during their time in office.17 The varying degrees of 
political stances that cite de Tocqueville confirm the importance of the work as part of 
American philosophy. One reason it has undoubtedly become so popular is its sheer 
length. It contains such a vast number of observations and thoughts that nearly any 
philosophical argument about America can find supporting evidence for its ideas within 
its pages.18 
 Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations also provide a valuable insight into the 
interplay of freedom of the press and democracy during America’s early years. 
Democracy in America is a window into the past through which America of the 1830s 
can be seen. By grounding a study of current news media in America with this historical 
and philosophical angle, larger trends of news media are easily identified; some of which 
have changed, and some of which have not. And the fact that de Tocqueville observed 
America as a foreigner meant his observations were more genuine than any self-
assessment by American citizens would perhaps have been at the same time. His words, 
even after 150 years of existence, speak for themselves.  
 Freedom of the press for de Tocqueville, as for Jefferson, was considered an 
important part of American democracy. It was also a freedom that could be abused. 
Tocqueville wrote in his chapter “On Freedom of the Press and America” that, “I confess 
that I do not accord to press freedom that entire instantaneous affection which one grants 
to things which are supremely good by their very nature. My affection for it stems from 
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my regard for the evils it prevents rather than for the benefits it produces.”19 He went on 
to suggest that press in France and America had an “extraordinary power,” a “strange 
mixture of good and evil that, without its presence, freedom could not thrive and with its 
presence good order could hardly survive.”20 This is the same paradox Thomas Jefferson 
experienced first hand: independent press provides a critical service in America, but as it 
is not forced to do so it inevitably directs attention to lesser matters.  
 News media still embodies this dual nature. Balance between freedom and 
responsibility constantly shifts and always will. But in the past decade, the emphasis 
news media placed on following its own agenda has grown substantially more than 
fulfilling its civic agenda in the United States. It is impossible, in some ways, to fault 
them for this self-absorption. Certainly news organizations have the freedom to pursue 
their own goals to an extent; but what if in chasing those goals the larger nature of 
American society is put at risk? What if democratic processes like elections are 
jeopardized? What if the balance in the government’s function in the formation of 
national policy is shifted? Should news organizations be responsible for changes caused 
by wielding such influence? 
 To understand these questions, and why they must be asked, the current state of 
the American news media must be understood. Its goals, the way it is organized, and the 
very nature of what news is must be examined. One thing is certain: this is no longer 
Thomas Jefferson’s news media.  
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1. AS SEEN ON TV  
 
 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America with a French audience in 
mind, so he constantly compared American and French society. And in the mid 1800s the 
French press differed greatly from that of America’s. Advertising was center to this 
polarity. De Tocqueville observed:  
 
In France, the trade advertisements take up a very limited space; the news 
items themselves are few; the essential part of a newspaper is that devoted 
to political discussion. In America, three-quarters of the bulky newspaper 
set before the reader’s eyes is filled with advertisements; the rest is most 
frequently full of political news or just anecdotes. Only occasionally and 
in some obscure corner will you spot one of those burning discussions 
which are the daily nourishment of French readers.21 
 
Newspapers in the United States served commerce to a greater extent than French papers 
at this time. Paul Starr identified the root of this stark difference between news styles in 
the unique development of American media. The press was more “popularly oriented” in 
the United States because the government sponsored news media growth without taxes, 
compared to many countries in Europe that taxed burgeoning media. Starr described this 
as a “unique path” for America that resulted in constant competition between privately 
owned and ad-supported news organizations.22  
 De Tocqueville’s observations also happened to foretell of what news media 
would become in the 21st century. Or rather, how it would stay the same. Today 
advertising is virtually ubiquitous in nearly all types of media, including news. Actual 
content of news mimics that of its earlier incarnation too, by trading political commentary 
for entertainment oriented subject matter. This trend persisted because news production 
 8 
continued to be run by similar organizations: private businesses. As a consequence, news 
corporations have to remain mindful of a wide range of economic interests while 
reporting the news.  
 Economic interests of news organizations are not always considered in the 
equation of the press and its democratic role, but an understanding of economics is 
crucial for the complete picture of news organizations. James T. Hamilton studied the 
role of economics in news media and found that in today’s media environment economic 
pressures and incentives guide a majority of decisions news organizations make.23   
 To look at news in economic terms, “news” itself must be redefined. Jefferson 
and de Tocqueville considered it a vital part of a democracy, but some, especially the 
companies who create and distribute it, consider news a product. Hamilton suggested that 
because there are so many economic considerations necessary for the successful 
distribution of news, it is by its very nature a commercial good.24  
 News is a type of information commodity, argues Hamilton, which economists 
define as having four unique aspects not found in other types of products. The first aspect 
of information products is that they are considered public goods. This means one person 
can read, or consume, an entire news product like a newspaper and then share it with 
someone else, who too can also fully consume it. Opposing examples are things like food 
and drink, which can only be fully consumed by an individual.25  
 The second aspect of information products is they are considered experience 
goods. To judge the quality of a newspaper or television show one really has to read or 
watch, or consume, the entire thing. This is different from products whose quality can be 
determined before it is purchased, like car.  
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 Because news stories have different qualities, the third aspect of information 
goods is also important: multiple dimensions. When news organizations report events, it 
can be done in a variety of different ways by different sources, and each story about a 
particular happening will be different from other sources in some way.26  
 The fourth aspect of information products is has a high fixed cost, and low 
variable cost, format of creation of news. Many resources are necessary to assemble the 
facts for a story and spend time to merge them into a news report. But once that high cost 
work is done, hundreds of copies of the story can be made for consumption at a very low 
cost, because the majority of the work went into the creation of the story.27 Hamilton 
shows these four aspects of news products explain, to a great degree, which news 
products actually end up being offered to the public. 28  
 So as news must be fully read or watched as an experience good, and reports on a 
similar incident can vary greatly with multiple product dimensions, news outlets create 
and consistently market certain qualities to maintain expectations about their news 
products. Television accomplishes this by relying on the style and personalities of certain 
presenters.29 Essentially this is branding of news; it lets news outlets exist simultaneously 
while reporting on essentially the same events.30 These branding and economic factors 
explain the importance of three aspects of news as information goods, and the fourth 
aspect is even more crucial.  
 High fixed costs and low variable costs are the aspect of information goods that 
most often defines what news gets reported. News organizations, mostly businesses 
dependant on profit for survival, have an economic incentive to create stories that appeal 
to the largest audience. Economically speaking, they do not want to pay the high fixed 
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cost of reporting to a very small number of people, negating the need for a low variable 
cost because people aren’t interested in consuming the story. Conversely, if many people 
are interested in a story then an incentive exists for news organizations to use more 
resources creating the demanded news product. This economic reality predicts what news 
stories get reported, regardless of whether or not their content could be important to civic 
life.31  
 Advertising makes this economic incentive profitable, and hence a reality. News 
media outlets receive the bulk of their profits from selling space in their news products to 
companies desiring public expose of their ads. And when news organization profits 
depend on advertising, there exists a strong incentive to attract as many people possible 
to consume the advertising infused news products. The end result is that news stories 
only a handful of people would read will not be created, but news stories many people 
would consume will. So even if a news story important to the function of the government 
is civically necessary, if few people are interested or if another story with the same 
number of interested consumers would cost less to produce, a news organization is 
economically inclined to report the lower cost story to maximize profits.32  
 Bias against expensive stories lacking obvious audiences is the reason American 
newspapers focused on simple “political news” and “anecdotes” for the majority of their 
coverage in de Tocqueville’s time, and it is still the main reason that hard political news 
lacks prevalence in news coverage today. In-depth political news is more expensive to 
research and report than news about lifestyle issues and entertainment. If people reading 
and watching news prefer lifestyle and entertainment stories, then advertisers will want to 
buy space where awareness of their product or service could reach the widest audience. 
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And because advertising equates to profits, and soft news stories are cheaper to produce, 
it makes monetary sense to give consumers and advertisers want they want.33  
 Problems arise because the press is a crucial part of American democracy, 
economics or no. If news organizations operate solely based on economic incentives 
there is no will to provide the more costly public service of news. Hamilton insisted that 
if benefits of in-depth political coverage were made a serious part of news organizations’ 
decision process on reporting instead of economics, then hard political news would be 
more prevalent.34 It also begs the question: if more political news were offered on a 
regular basis, would consumers then become more interested in it, hence shifting the 
market demand and attracting advertisers? 
 There is another side to advertising in media that can actually increase the civic 
importance of news. Advertising, in some situations, allows for news media to be sold 
more broadly because it helps cover the initial cost of reporting news stories.35 And 
allowing access to political content for more readers is generally positive for democracy, 
since the government ultimately represents countries’ citizens. Yet this positive 
advertising influence is more characteristic of earlier newspapers, which were far less 
omnipresent than current media and needed broader consumer reach. 
 Hard political news loses out in this economic model, but news organizations still 
produce political news. There exist other incentives that drive political news creation that 
are less widespread across media outlets. Hamilton suggested personal political motives 
like money, popularity, and political races are some of these reasons.36 The possibility of 
partisan bias brings up another aspect of news, objectivity, which Hamilton also 
suggested arose from economic incentives.  
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2. Fair & Balanced™ 
 
 News today is widely assumed to be objective, which is certainly a desirable trait 
if it has a democratic function. Noted in the 1830s as well, de Tocqueville wrote: 
“Whenever each citizen is granted the right to govern society, recognition has to be given 
to his capacity to choose between the different viewpoints which trouble his fellow 
citizens and to appreciate the different facts which may guide his judgment.”37 His 
acknowledgement that people must understand their government to best participate in it is 
an important one. Therefore news, the system by which information is spread to citizens, 
should be objective in presenting information without injecting personal opinions into 
reporting to sway readers. This idea persists, and it would be a task to find news outlets 
today that publicly rejected the notion of their own objectivity.  
 But objectivity has not always been news organizations’ modus operandi. For 
almost half of the press’ existence in America, news outlets did nothing to hide their 
politically driven motives for reporting news. In fact they pronounced them.38 Thomas 
Jefferson’s experience showed an example of this. The Federalist Party owned the 
majority of newspapers, which advocated for Federalist political goals and publicly 
smeared Jefferson and the Republicans to a great extent.39 What did Jefferson do when 
this happened? He started sponsoring reporters and newspapers to publicly advocate for 
Republican policies in retaliation.40 And there were no qualms about doing so. It was 
culturally understood that every paper had an agenda. Even though de Tocqueville’s 
words suggest objectivity’s importance, he acknowledged the fact that citizens must 
choose from amongst wide arrays of varying perspectives on politics. Each, of course, 
with it’s own advocating newspaper. 
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 What changed between then and now lies again in the economics of news 
organizations. Hamilton contended that the dropping of political bias from news reporting 
came at predictable times and places in history.41 Specifically, the rise in objectivity 
occurred in America from the 1870s to the 1900s. Most newspapers in 1870 were 
blatantly affiliated with a political party, as was the historical norm; newspapers that did 
not choose a political affiliation made up only thirteen percent of news sources.42 But by 
1880 the percentage of independent newspapers rose to thirty-four percent, and by 1900 
almost half of the total number of newspapers were not affiliated with any political 
operatives.43  
 Reasoning behind objective newspapers was sound. It occurred most often in 
large cities, where there was a concentrated group of people interested in reading news as 
well as advertisers willing to pay for ad space.44 Recall, because the initial cost to create a 
news story is high, greater circulation recoups that cost. More readers were good for a 
newspaper. It was also beneficial for advertisers who wanted the maximum amount of 
exposure of their product or service; the price to put an ad in large circulation newspapers 
might be more expensive up front, but the cost per viewer was actually much lower than 
smaller papers. Advertising, in turn, allowed newspapers to lower the sale price of the 
paper by covering initial cost, which increased readership.45 Advertisers saved time by 
only having to do business with one newspaper instead of many smaller ones. Consumer 
goods advertisements also increased at this time, and the more people that could be 
reached with an ad the better.46  
 There was one more challenge to growth. When small newspapers flourished in 
the 1840s a printing press cost about $5,000 and could fully handle the printing needs for 
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a small circulation. By the 1880s however, printing presses advanced technologically and 
could print many more copies; they also cost $80,000. Newspapers needed profits from 
increased readership to support the costs involved in getting that audience in the first 
place.47   
 Objectivity stemmed from these economic incentives because a larger audience 
would be more likely to read an objective paper. Republicans would not read a paper 
blatantly shilling for the Democratic Party and vice versa. But Democrats, Republicans, 
and people without a party affiliation all could read an independent and objective 
newspaper. Independent papers gained much larger audiences that increased revenues for 
news organizations.48 Political newspapers could not keep up with this growth and 
eventually became ineffective.49 
 Today, objectivity is an assumed aspect of journalism. Yet some news 
organizations, FOX News for instance, still exhibit bias. Assumed explanations for this 
bias range from media conspiracies, social class dissonance, and political preferences of 
organization owners.50 But if news is viewed as a product, there is a clearer explanation 
for reporting bias.  
 The three 24-hour news channels are an example of subtle bias. CNN, MSNBC, 
and FOX News all compete for the same pool of viewers who want news constantly 
available on television. The channels also all claim objectivity in reporting, especially 
FOX with its “Fair & Balanced” slogan. But if they simply reported news with no special 
perspective on events, viewers could easily go back and forth between networks with no 
preference as to which one they watch at any given moment. This would be detrimental 
for advertisers, who want predictable audiences to better tailor ads. So to gain viewers, 
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FOX News puts a conservative spin on their reporting and attracts conservative leaning 
viewers away from CNN and MSNBC. In turn MSNBC puts a liberal spin on their 
reporting, so that liberal minded viewers know what to expect from the network and are 
more likely to tune in. CNN is left with everyone else. News products are designed to 
attract certain viewers because of the nature of experience goods, and people have to 
consume a news story before assessing its quality, so 24-hour cable news networks brand 
themselves in different ways to stand apart from competitors to gain viewers with 
particular content expectations.51  
 The next logical step beyond objectivity, therefore, is for news organizations to 
spin reporting slightly to attract more viewers, because there must be a reason for people 
to choose FOX News over MSNBC. This is exactly what Hamilton identifies in cable 
news. With three similar products offering round the clock objective news coverage, 
subtle bias in reporting is an effective way to differentiate from competitors.52 However, 
he does not claim that this is the sole reason for media bias. A news organization owner 
may also sacrifice certain audiences if pursuing certain policies are important to them, or 
because of the size of a news organization bias of single reporters just may not be 
noticed.53 Either way, it makes economic sense to inject bias into news reporting.  
 Yet there is damaging consequence of this brand-injected bias not found in the 
blatantly partisan press of early America: news outlets continue to claim objectivity in 
reporting. By presenting biased reporting as purely objective, news outlets force the 
assumption competing news sources are categorically wrong. If viewers believe their 
subtly biased news source of choice to be objective, then all other news sources—biased 
or unbiased—appear incorrect by default because their reporting does not coincide with 
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viewers’ perceptions of “objective” reality. This creates serious problems for a 
democratic society, where citizens must make informed decisions to adequately 
participate in government. Viewers who cling to one source only receive biased 
reporting, leading to narrow understandings of politics and society and marginalized 
political discourse. It all stems from falsely claiming objectivity, the effects of which are 
exacerbated by the limited number of media outlets.   
 
 
3. And Then There Were Five  
  
 Economics is not the only perspective with which to analyze news media. The 
spread of information affects a nation’s culture, inevitably it is intertwined with politics, 
and it shapes society to a great degree. But economic analysis of news media is most 
useful is because it explains decisions made by media outlets. At their core, major news 
organizations are businesses, and therefore operate with a keen notion of economic 
realities. In a few cases economic influences over news created positive changes, such as 
the rise of objectivity in the nineteenth century. However, negative changes more often 
result from solely pursuing economic goals. 
 Conglomeration of news media is one of those negative changes. The process 
began in the mid 1800s, the same time as news became more objective and independent 
of political affiliations. Objectivity became the accepted norm for news organizations not 
because it was better for democracy, although it was, but because it meant that 
newspapers could reach wider audiences and increase profits. Advertising was the root of 
this profit increase, and although it did allow for greater access to the news by lowering 
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costs for people wanting to purchase news, it also led to the publisher’s perception of 
readers as consumers rather than participants in a civic society.54 Advertising also 
broadened its influence by not only selling products but shaping public perceptions of 
corporations. It became common for news stories written by publicity agents on behalf of 
companies to be published as if they were news.55 Having a broad reach to many readers 
is not positive in this case; if advertising becomes the focus of a news source it looses the 
fostering effects of broad civic involvement.  
 Newspapers became larger as this growth process progressed, and as a result, or 
economic reality, the number of newspapers declined. Buying competitive newspapers 
increased audience and profits. Centralization occurred in other news mediums as time 
went on, and today most major media organizations own many different outlets for 
media. Again, it makes sense economically. Hamilton argued that because of the high 
initial cost of reporting news, the more times a news story can be sold results in increased 
return of investment in a news product. If a single company owns radio and television 
stations, print media outlets, and have an Internet presence, then one news story can be 
distributed through all of these channels.56  
 He also cited three other concerns generated by media conglomerates: self-
coverage, self-promotion, and self-dealing. People working for a news conglomerates 
may not be forthcoming with negative news stories about the owner, or parent, 
company.57 News companies could promote entertainment news about movies, music, or 
other products produced by their parent conglomerate. This type of news is much less 
expensive and easy to access, so its production is cheaper.58 But one of the problems 
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caused by this focus is a lack of reporting on political and civic news that is important to 
the functioning of a democratic government.  
 This is where an economic view of news media falls short. So far, economics 
explains what news media products are likely to be produced, what the objective tone of 
reporting for news outlets is and how it came to exist, and the ever-increasing size of 
media companies at the cost of diversity in news outlets. But this only explains the cause 
of news, not its effect. Economics does not explain media from a societal point of view. 
So although media conglomerates make economic sense, they do not make sense for the 
democratic societies. Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Ben H. Bagdikian contended that 
while conglomeration is not a new fad in industry, for the media it carries a greater 
importance. Media conglomerates, he said, “do not manufacture nuts and bolts: they 
manufacture a social and political world.”59 
 Bagdikian, in his work The New Media Monopoly, detailed the conglomeration of 
the media over the past decades and its effect on America. News media was a vital part of 
this media centralization. He argued that major media companies work together, while 
still being competitors, and exhibit monopolistic tendencies while not technically being a 
monopoly. This is achieved in one way by having a member of the governing board of 
one media company sitting on the board of another media organization as well. This 
position is called an interlocking board member. In a study published in the Columbia 
Journalism Review in 2003, major media companies News Corporation, Time Warner, 
Disney, and Viacom had forty-five interlocking board members between them.60 An even 
greater link between these companies is their joint ventures, where two or more media 
conglomerates team up to provide content and reap profit. The five biggest media 
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conglomerates, which include the four just mentioned, are partners with each other in 141 
different businesses. One example cited by Bagdikian is News Corporation, which runs 
FOX News. They are a part of 63 different joint ventures with competing media 
conglomerates across magazines, music companies, and cable and satellite TV channels 
in America and internationally; they share a financial stake in all of them.61 
 The five major conglomerates also form an immensely powerful lobby in 
Washington D.C. called the National Association of Broadcasters. This alliance jointly 
advocates favorable laws for business goals, or against media regulations.62 Some 
regulations limit the amount of media control a single corporation can have within a 
given geographic area. These might eventually be removed; Michael Powell, chairman of 
the Federal Communications Commission, before becoming chairman of the Board of 
Visitors at the College of William & Mary, made clear in 2002 his consenting opinion 
that a single company could own all media outlets in a given area.63  
 Conglomeration raises serious questions about the health of news in American 
democracy. Bagdikian argued that the conglomeration of media, especially news media, 
limits a wide discussion of political issues needed by a large country like America. 
Ultimately he felt citizens were being let down by the current state of news media in 
America, and that the problem stemmed from the great influence that media 
conglomerates have in today’s world.64  
 One alternative news option in existence to media conglomerate programming is 
the Public Broadcasting System, or PBS. It is hard, however, for this state sponsored 
broadcaster to compete because it is funded only by Congress and public donations; the 
budgets never end up being big enough to compete with for-profit media 
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conglomerates.65 What is terribly ironic about America’s public broadcasting is that 
during the reconstruction of Japan after World War II, American commanders ordered 
that the Japanese develop an unpoliticized and non-commercial public media system not 
dependant on yearly funds from parliament. Despite the fact this type of system was 
nonexistent in the United States, Bagdikian said, “the American occupying forces 
declared publicly that no modern democracy should be without one.” This system today 
is very much like the British Broadcasting Corporation, which provides free public media 
in addition to paid, privately owned channels.66  
 The current state of profit driven conglomeration within American news media is 
perhaps one of the greatest changes in American society since Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
visit in 1831. His observations of a vibrant state of public discourse, where nearly anyone 
could start a newspaper for themselves, ultimately kept news local: 
 
 In the United States, scarcely a hamlet lacks its newspaper. You 
can easily imagine that, among so many antagonists, neither discipline nor 
unified action is likely; each paper, therefore, fights beneath its own 
banner. Not that all political newspapers in the Union are lined up for or 
against the administration but they employ a hundred different means to 
attack or defend it. In the United States, therefore, newspapers are unable 
to form those great waves of opinion which undermine or sweep over the 
most powerful of barriers. This division of the influences of the press also 
produces other effects no less startling. Since a newspaper can be founded 
quite easily, everyone can take to it; alternatively competition reduces any 
hope of great profits, which dissuades the most able of industrialists from 
involvement in such enterprises. Moreover, even though newspapers could 
be a source of wealth, their excessive numbers prevent enough talented 
writers coming forward to edit them all.67 
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This could not be farther from the current state of media in America. The vast majority of 
accessible news sources are owned by a handful of expansive, economically driven media 
conglomerates. For them news is about profit. But what does that mean for America? Can 
news media companies intentionally or unintentionally shape American society? Is there 
any balance to media’s reporting? Should news organizations have a wider responsibility 
than their stockholders? Have these changes in news media altered the course of 
American history? 
 
 
4. Moments that Changed History  
 
 Alexis de Tocqueville described elegantly the unique power that newspapers had 
during the 1800s to unite citizens by citing their influence as “the only way of being able 
to place the same thought at the same moment into a thousand minds.”68 This holds true 
to news media today, although mediums for placing thoughts have changed dramatically 
and the number of reachable minds is in the hundreds of millions.  
 De Tocqueville also observed, “When an idea has seized the mind of the 
American people, be it correct or unreasonable, nothing is harder than to rid them of it.”69 
This fact remains true as well, being no shortage of examples since the formation of 
America itself. This focused history of news media and America examines the 
combination of these two ideas: the great recent power of media in America, and the 
uncanny knack of Americans to be influenced by it.  
 This study is a recent history focusing on the ten years from 1999 to 2009. The 
reason for limiting the scope to this period is that 24-hour television news became 
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established and accepted sources during this time. The Pew Project for Excellence in 
Journalism put the total number of individual viewers of cable news near 186 million 
people in 2009.70 This is over one third of the American population. 24-Hour cable news 
has the ability to place a lot of thoughts into a lot of minds. The decade following 1999 
also saw pass a handful of events that truly shaped America, some of which were 
influenced by 24-hour news.  
 There is also something about 24-hour news that makes it stand out from network 
news and other media formats. It is broadcasting new content for a solid 17 hours per 
day, excluding the early morning hours. This means 24-hour news outlets CNN, 
MSNBC, and FOX News have a continuous running commentary on everything 
happening during the day. Responses to new developments in breaking news are almost 
instantaneous, and the channels’ pundits provide plenty of opinions on a nightly basis. It 
is often referred to as an “echo chamber” where rumors get repeated enough to be 
considered reality. Discourse on the majority of 24-hour news programming tends toward 
entertainment rather than enrichment, and this seems to have a detrimental effect on 
American society. Nevertheless, by the very nature of their constant reporting, 24-hour 
news channels define the political conversation in America to a great degree.  
 Television as a medium is also extremely potent; a fact seemingly not well 
understood by those who watch it. TV varies greatly from print, radio, and the Internet. It 
is the closest representation of human interaction between news presenters and viewers. 
Seeing and hearing other people stimulates the human psyche more than reading opinions 
on paper. Psychological studies show different ways people can be affected by television, 
most of which are hard to detect and apply directly to television news.  
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 Because of the endless supply of content that could be covered on the topic of 24-
hour television news, as even now more is being created, this study limits its focus to two 
moments. These moments from the past decade are instances where 24-hour news—
without any doubt—shaped the outcome of American history. They are moments an 
overwhelming majority of Americans have experienced, and correspond to two vital 
aspects of American society: elections and government policy. These two instances show 
the true influence of 24-hour television news.  
 But as the past decade gave rise to acceptance of 24-hour television news, it also 
gave rise to one of its staunchest critics in the form of an unassuming comedy program. 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart critiqued 24-hour news with a comedic focus, and in 
doing so attracted journalistic respect. The New York Times reported results of a Pew 
Research Center Poll conducted in 2007 that ranked the show’s host Jon Stewart as the 
fourth most trusted journalist in America. This placed him on the same level as legitimate 
newsmen Brian Williams, Dan Rather, and Tom Brokaw.71 High praise for someone who 
describes himself as a reporter of “fake news.” Stewart’s satire truly became a potent 
balance to 24-hour news in its own right.  
 The intersection of 24-hour news, psychology, American Government, 
economics, and The Daily Show, together provide a deeper understanding of America’s 
recent past, and hopefully its future.  
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TWO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Election that Went Awry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CNN began their Election Day coverage at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on November 
7.72 The next President of the United States would be decided at some point that night, or 
perhaps early the next day, after ballots cast by over 100 million American voters were 
carefully tallied. It promised to be an exciting conclusion to a hard fought campaign by 
both the Republican and Democratic parties. One of the most sought after prizes by the 
candidates was the State of Florida, which would give its winner 25 Electoral College 
votes towards the 270 minimum needed to be elected President of the United States.  
 Over the next two hours, CNN anchors brought up the importance of the Florida 
race a number of times. Correspondent Mark Potter reminded viewers “Historically, for 
Republicans, a win in Florida’s presidential race is considered essential. No Republican 
has made it to the White House without winning Florida since 1924.” CNN anchor Judy 
Woodruff said of the races in Florida and elsewhere that it was “just one of several states 
where the race for the White House is incredibly close.”73 Indeed, a close race was 
anticipated, and Americans knew it. Over 40 million households watched the election 
unfold on broadcast or cable news television channels.74  
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 Cable news networks CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News competed fiercely against 
each other and broadcast staples CBS, ABC, and NBC for this television audience, each 
with their own set of high profile commentators and unique angles of analysis. But 
although these competing television news sources appeared different enough, the core of 
their reporting had more in common than viewers realized. The 2000 election would 
prove to be infamous in American history.  
 Providing comprehensive coverage of a national election is both expensive and 
time consuming for a news outlet. So for the 2000 election six news organizations 
employed a jointly owned service to provide exit-polling data throughout Election Day, 
as well as vote counts from areas thought to represent a state’s eventual winner. The 
name of this consortium was the Voter News Service (VNS), and its news channel 
members were CNN, CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX News, and the Associated Press.75 The 
business formed in 1993 both to broaden exit-polling capabilities and, more importantly, 
to cut costs. The six news organizations used VNS during the 2000 election for these 
reasons.76 The most important information provided to news services by VNS was the 
earliest possible call of the winner, or more realistically, the projected winner. VNS used 
computer analysis of exit-polling and returns data to accomplish this, and the speed at 
which VNS delivered their projections varied widely: some calls networks had by the 
time state polls closed based solely on exit-polling, some after polls had closed based on 
actual vote counts, and some were withheld if data was unclear.  
 The predictions provided by the Voter News Service, however, were not 
automatically accepted by the news services that employed them. During the 2000 
election, CNN and CBS had a joint “Decision Team” whose task was to analyze VNS 
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data and predictions. The team would agree on a final decision for both news channels, 
which would then ultimately be approved by executives at their respective organizations. 
Other news channels had different arrangements. It is also important to note that VNS 
passed along its data to all of its owners at the same time, but different networks had 
varying protocols to determine when a winner should be reported on air. This resulted in 
news channels reporting results at varying times during the night.77 In fact, the entire 
reason for the existence of the CNN/CBS decision team was to have a second opinion on 
predictions besides that of VNS. They were not only to analyze the calls that VNS 
provided; the decision teams could also make decisions before a call was given to them. 
This occurred in the very first election in which VNS was used. During the congressional 
elections in 1994, ABC reported results from a network decision team before VNS had 
provided analysis and data to the other members of the consortium. The other news 
networks created similar teams after this incident so that they too could call elections 
earlier than competing networks as ABC had. Tom Hannon, a CNN Political Director, 
referred to this competition between networks to first report the election winner as “an 
arms race,” despite claims from the networks themselves claiming accuracy as the goal.78 
The purpose of VNS by 2000 was clearly relegated only to cost cutting.  
 By 7:00 p.m. on November 7, CNN was full swing into their political coverage 
and finally gearing up for the Election Night drama to begin. Anchor Bernard Shaw 
reported, “At 7:00 the polls have closed in certain states and CNN is looking at what is 
going on. In Florida, this race between Gore and Bush [is] too close to call.” Only Shaw 
was technically incorrect, because polls in Florida had not yet closed. The western 
panhandle of the state was located in the Central Time Zone, where it was currently 6:00 
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p.m. and people had an hour left to cast ballots. Florida commentary continued on CNN, 
this time from senior analyst Jeff Greenfield. “This is the one we will be watching all 
night,” he said, “Gore made 19 visits to the state, Bush 13.  They’ve poured in millions of 
dollars.  Fourth biggest prize and it’s up for grabs.” Although VNS provided exit-polling 
data at this point, the Decision Team for CNN and CBS decided to hold off on making a 
call until they had legitimate results.79 
 At 7:45 p.m., the Decision Team began to look at the new data coming from 
Florida to see if a possible winner could be determined. George Bush lead at that point, 
with only 4 percent of the votes counted; yet VNS predicted that Gore would end up with 
a sizeable win.80  
 At 7:48 p.m. Gore was projected to win Florida by NBC, the first network to 
make a call in his favor.81  
 Two minutes later at 7:50 p.m. both CBS and CNN echoed NBC’s Florida win 
projection for Gore. CNN anchor Judy Woodruff reported, “A big call to make, CNN 
announces that we call Florida in the Al Gore column.”82 But this call was still a 
projection at this point, even though it was misleadingly stated as fact. 
 At 7:52 p.m., the Voter News Service called the Florida race in Gore’s favor.83 
 Six minutes later at 8:00 p.m. voting ended in the areas located in the Central 
Time Zone in western Florida.84  
 By 8:02 p.m. the Associated Press and each of the five news networks using VNS 
projected Florida as being won by Democratic Party candidate Al Gore.85  
 It is important to realize how fast these calls happened. In fourteen minutes, all 
news channels called Florida for Gore, many before VNS provided data on the outcome. 
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The news channels also called the race before voting had ended in the state. This was 
only by 10 minutes, so there was little time to significantly influence the outcome, but the 
oversight was still significant. This mistake showed how fast the news channels sought 
results, and how they sacrificed accuracy for speed.  
 The call wouldn’t be accurate for long. Just under two hours later at 9:45, CNN 
anchor Bernard Shaw came on air to address viewers; “Stand by, stand by,” he said. 
“CNN right now is moving our earlier declaration of Florida back to the too-close-to-call 
column.” 86  
 “Oh, waiter, one order of crow” Jeff Greenfield joked. 87  
 Because of the somewhat embarrassing situation, Bill Schneider, a polling expert 
for CNN, explained the criteria for making the final election call. He revealed that all of 
CNN’s data was coming from the Voter News Service; it was the first mention of the 
source of election data during the course of the evening by CNN.88 
 As the call of Gore’s Florida victory was being rescinded, another news program 
providing live 2000 election coverage began. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart started at 
10:00 p.m. that evening, reporting live for the first time ever. The previous night, Jon 
Stewart had warned viewers about the show’s inexperience with live Election Day 
coverage, “I promise, we’re going to have results, live analysis, reports from the field. 
We, we’ve never gone live before, it’s going to be a spectacular disaster, I promise 
you.”89 This hyperbolic prediction would eventually come to pass, but for the “real” news 
networks instead of The Daily Show.  
 Jon Stewart began the show’s election coverage with an update on how the races 
were going. “Excuse me,” he said, clearing his throat while the applause of the audience 
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died out, “It is now… 10:02 on the East Coast. Uh, the polls just closed in um, let’s say 
Arizona. Uh, many other states have already projected winners in the big race; we’re 
going to get you caught up with some election results right now. Uh, we can tell you right 
now in the Electoral College, it’s Al Gore, one hundred and ninety-eight electoral votes,” 
he said while the crowd screamed wildly, “George W. Bush, one hundred and eighty five, 
uh, electoral votes.” The screaming and cheering continued, and Stewart paused for a 
moment before speaking again. “All right kids, fair enough. Now remember this uh, is 
a—a—an office of journalism, not a partisan place.” The crowd laughed. “We’re a news 
organization, and we can’t… pander.” The crowd laughed again, and after some more 
results from individual states Stewart concluded the segment, “So that’s where we stand, 
right now—as we speak it’s very close to call.”90 
 At 10:16 p.m. the Voter News Service officially rescinded its call for Gore as the 
winner in Florida.91 
 By 10:18 p.m. all of the other television news stations had done so as well. On 
CNN the anchors discussed the retracted call; Greenfield appropriately commented, 
“Well, you know, listen, there’s nothing more delightful—and I have to say this as a 
member of the press—than watching an election when you actually have to wait and see 
what the voters are going to do.”92 
 The Daily Show received information of the Gore win retraction first from Senator 
Bob Dole, a guest on the program that evening. During the interview with Dole, Stewart 
asked about what the results of the 2000 election would mean for the country. “Is it still 
possible do you think, that we could have a Republican triple crown, that, that George W. 
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Bush could win the presidency and the Republicans would maintain control of the Senate 
and the House?”  
  “I, I think we’ll maintain, uh, control of the senate,” Dole responded, “—its 
pretty close though we’ve lost some seats, uh, the House—I haven’t heard any races, but, 
uh, I think the one to watch is the presidential race. When Bush lost Pennsylvania, uh that 
was a big minus for Bush. But I, I think Florida may be back in play. I think there’s some 
people starting to hedge a bit, maybe they called Florida too early.”  
 “Right, well we all know that the voters down there are a little older,” Stewart 
joked, “and it does take them longer to get to the polls, so it’s hard to count those.” The 
crowd laughed as Dole added, “It takes a while to squeeze the orange juice too.”93 
 After a commercial break and another electoral update, The Daily Show played a 
segment explaining the source of their election data. “All night we have been providing 
you with up to the minute results and graphics” Stewart said. “How do we do it? It’s on 
the minds of all the viewers. Vance DeGeneres is manning our cyber vote info center, 
and he’s going to walk us through it. Vance?” 
 “Thanks Jon,” DeGeneres replied. “Well, indeed I am sitting here in what is the 
very nerve center of tonight’s operations. Uh, let me see if I can’t walk you through this 
Jon. Um, now the cyber vote info center, uh, it uh, processes data from several broadband 
networks. Now the information, uh, electronic, is collected and distributed via satellite, 
uh, and RF, uh, relay, through a poly-cathode multi-synchronous, uh, multi-channel, uh, 
VH decoding unit. Now Chuck if we can pull out here a little bit,” he asked as the clip 
showed a bank of five televisions stacked two high all tuned to different news networks, 
including CNN. DeGeneres continued “uh, now all this data is then, uh, retransmitted 
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through what is essentially a cathode tube, and with refracted light we see the visual 
image accompanied by sound waves, uh, that are capable of being interpreted by the 
human brain.” 
  “Are you telling me the cyber vote info center is just five TV sets tuned to other 
channels?” Stewart asked. 
  “Well,” DeGeneres replied flatly, “I think that’s a bit of an oversimplification 
Jon.”94 
 In fact this was essentially what the other news channels were doing: watching to 
see who called a winner first and then repeating that call as quickly as possible, so as not 
to appear to have late coverage. This occurred with the Florida call for Gore. In fourteen 
minutes all major television news sources followed NBC’s original call, even though the 
Voter News Service had not yet given a winner. The first instance of a premature call 
would also not be the last mistake for the evening.  
 Almost five hours after Florida was miscalled, with results still not in at 1:45 a.m., 
CNN anchor Bernard Shaw again told the audience Florida is still “too close to call.” Hal 
Bruno, a CNN commentator, postulated that the vote “has gotten so close now that 
there’s just absolutely no way of counting it until probably every last vote is in.”95 
 Within the next twenty minutes, new data from election results processed by VNS 
arrived at the news networks. It showed Bush ahead by 50,000 votes; however this was 
not actually the case as there was a computer error at VNS that exaggerated his lead.96  
 Nevertheless, the CNN/CBS Decision Team considered calling Florida for Bush 
at 2:10 a.m.; over half of the 180,000 votes that were still to be counted had to be 
awarded to Gore for him to win. Yet here too these numbers were incorrect, there were 
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still 400,000 votes to be tallied in counties that strongly leaned Democratic. Based on 
numbers the news sources had however, Bush appeared poised to win, and the CNN 
Decision Team too thought this would happen.97  
 FOX News analyzed the same data provided by VNS at 2:10 a.m. as well. The 
analyst in charge of making the final decision about suggesting a winner at FOX was 
George W. Bush’s first cousin, John Ellis. Gore was thought to need 63 percent of the 
votes that had not yet been counted, which did not seem probable. Ellis suggested that 
FOX call the race in favor of his cousin.98 
 At 2:15 a.m. FOX News reported that George Bush won the Florida election, and 
with it the presidency of the United States.99  
 At 2:16 a.m. NBC made the same call.100 
 At 2:17 a.m. CNN anchor Bernard Shaw reported, “George Bush, governor of 
Texas, will become the 43rd President of the United States. At 18 minutes past two 
o’clock eastern time, CNN declares that George Walker Bush has won Florida’s 25 
electoral votes and this should put him over the top.” CNN did not look at the Associated 
Press tally or the official count with the Florida Secretary of State, both of which had 
Bush with a less expansive lead.101  
 At 2:20 a.m. ABC echoed the previous reports, and awarded the presidency to 
Bush. It was the last network to report this news, all of them having done so within a five 
minute period. The Associated Press and the Voter News service stayed silent on the 
results, and ultimately did not call a winner for the Florida race.102 
 Dan Rather of CBS provided his signature stylish commentary on the outcome of 
the race: "Let's give a tip of the Stetson to the loser, Vice President Al Gore, and at the 
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same time, a big tip and a hip, hip, hurrah and a great big Texas howdy to the new 
president of the United States. Sip it. Savor it. Cup it. Photostat it. Underline it in red. 
Press it in a book. Put it in an album. Hang it on the wall. George Bush is the next 
President of the United States." This was being said while "Bush elected president" was 
plastered on the screen.103 
 By 3:00 a.m. Gore had called Bush to concede the race and is prepared to give a 
public concession speech in Nashville. He was, to a great degree, making decisions on 
information that television news channels reported.104  
 At 4:10 a.m. the difference between Bush and Gore was officially around 1,800 
votes, which is much less than the 30,000-vote difference predicted earlier in the night.105 
This meant a mandatory recount for Florida; the winner of the presidential race was still 
unknown.  
 Soon after this, CNN finished up its coverage of the 2000 election. In a final bit of 
analysis, CNN anchor Judy Woodruff shared a very insightful comment: “You know, it’s 
one thing to say it’s a close race, but clearly, part of what’s been going on with the 
rollercoaster nature of it tonight is the fact that we are a news organization.  
 “And there are news organizations out there that have been anxious to call these 
results just as soon as we were able to—based on exit polling, interviews with voters as 
they left the polling places, and also based on key precincts, sample precincts around the 
different states.  
 “So it’s the news organizations that are frankly creating part of what’s going on 
tonight—the atmosphere, the ups and downs.”106 
 The reliance on the Voter News Service certainly caused problems as well during 
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the 2000 election by providing bad data to news organizations. It predicted winners of 8 
states with exit polling that ended up losing, and made 3 incorrect calls.107 But the miscall 
in Florida could not fully be attributed to VNS because they did not provide a sure 
prediction of who would win. The blame for the call lay on the news networks 
themselves, and their rush to report the election’s results before competing channels.  
 
 
1. “Indecision” Was Supposed To Be a Joke 
  
 The next day, November 8, The Daily Show made a mockery of the previous 
evening’s election reporting by the cable and broadcast news networks. The first segment 
on the election began by transitioning to a video clip of a rotund, elderly man deseed 
head-to-toe in Bush campaign gear rotating back and forth, feet planted, chanting “A-
Bush, a-Bush, Bush!”  
 “But that jig was up,” Jon Stewart remarked in reference to the ridiculous dancing 
supporter, “when in came a staggering moment of truth…” The screen showed the four 
main CNN anchors from the previous night definitively calling the Florida election for Al 
Gore at 8:25 p.m.    
 “Only it wasn’t true,” Stewart interjected. The screen cut back to the CNN 
anchors at 9:55p.m., withdrawing their former call in favor of Gore in Florida and 
deeming the race “too close to call.”  
 “Tension mounted throughout the evening,” he continued, “then, at 2:18 Eastern 
Standard Time, the real moment of truth.” The CNN anchors were then shown 
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proclaiming that George Walker Bush would become the 43rd President of the United 
States, his face superimposed on a picture of the White House and an American flag.  
 “Only that wasn’t true either” Steward said, now clearly exasperated. A final clip 
played from CNN at 4:10 a.m. reported that Florida ballots would undergo a mandatory 
recount.  Stewart flatly asked: “How’d they let those nincompoops on cable?”108 
 This critique of the handling of the 2000 election results by 24-hour news 
effectively shows how fickle CNN appeared throughout the previous evening by 
continuously making incorrect reports about who had won. And although CNN was the 
specific target of mockery in this instance, any of the other news channels could easily be 
substituted in their place. The method The Daily Show used to show reporting 
inconsistencies was also extremely effective; by showing back-to-back clips of CNN’s 
calls during the course of the evening, it made their mistakes blatantly obvious. It was 
much more powerful to actually see the clips of bad calls than to simply read about what 
happened—it was unequivocal proof. This is a tactic The Daily Show would use with 
increasing frequency to underscore the inaccuracies and detrimental emphasis on speed 
of 24-hour television news. Stewart also called the anchors at CNN, and presumably the 
rest of the channel itself, nincompoops. This was direct critique of CNN’s methods that 
led to the mishandling and confusion of the 2000 election.  
 But CNN executives did not need The Daily Show making fun of them to realize 
they had made a series of grave errors. Soon after the election, CNN commissioned an 
investigation to pinpoint exactly what wrong during the course of the evening. The 
report, entitled “Television’s Performance on Election Night 2000,” was released four 
months later on February 22, 2001.109  
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 The study was not haphazardly done. CNN gave three heavyweights of the 
journalism world unfettered access to whatever information they wanted from the news 
organization. The investigators were Joan Konner, a professor and former dean of 
Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism who had worked in television 
journalism as executive producer for Bill Moyers and had gotten “every major award in 
broadcast journalism,” James Risser, a past director of Stanford University’s John S. 
Knight Fellowships for Professional Journalists and twice recipient of the Pulitzer Prize, 
and Ben Wattenberg, a widely syndicated columnist and political moderator on PBS who 
served under three presidents on various task forces and advisory boards.110 These 
investigators would not be influenced by pressure from CNN to cast them in a more 
positive light than they deserved. It is also important to note that CNN was the only 
television news station to have an assessment of their 2000 election coverage performed 
by outside investigators.111  
 The report, although focused on CNN in particular, found problematic reporting 
on Election Night to be bigger than any single news outlet. Indeed, Konner, Risser, and 
Wattenberg referred to the mistakes that led to the mishandling of the election results as 
“systemic faults shared in one way or another by all the networks.”112 In their ultimate 
conclusion they contended, “CNN and other television networks, while acting within 
their legal and journalistic rights, failed their journalistic mission and reported the 2000 
presidential election in a way that improperly interfered with the election process.”113 
 The driving motive behind relying on exit polling and other shoddy prediction 
data was economic competition between the news networks themselves; none of them 
wanted to be the last station reporting important information, and being first was 
 37 
desirable.114 This overemphasis on competition makes perfect sense if news outlets are 
viewed as businesses instead of as a critical part of America’s democratic process. Profit 
then becomes their ultimate goal, which is maximized only by increasing viewers, and 
being first to report a news story can increase viewership and the perception of a news 
outlet’s prestige. Yet on Election Night the time difference between reporting was so 
slight it could hardly entice viewers to switch their news coverage; the only perk to being 
the first to provide results was perhaps bragging rights. The emphasis on competition 
paired with another motive that the investigators referred to as the “desire to satisfy 
perceived audience demands to provide an election result” even if that need did not 
actually exist.115 Although this reason was not as important as inter-network competition, 
it did explain part of the reasoning behind he hastened wrapping up of election coverage. 
Fatigue might also have contributed in some way, since news networks had been 
providing special election coverage for at least ten hours that day.  
 But despite emphasis on competition during the election broadcast, behind the 
scenes the news networks did the opposite. Reliance on the Voter News Service meant all 
television news outlets had the exact same set of data to analyze; there was no alternate 
place to get election predictions. Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg called this practice 
“questionable” and suggested, “there should be at least one competitive source available 
for both exit polling and vote counting.”116 Once again, if the news networks were 
viewed as businesses before a public service, then their collective reliance on a single 
service to provide election data was not surprising. By relying on the VNS, all of the 
networks saved a considerable amount of money. Amassing timely nationwide data on 
such a scale would have been expensive for each individual network, so conglomerating 
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resources made good business sense. But good business sense did not equate to 
journalistic responsibility in the case of VNS. No network planned on VNS providing 
inaccurate data, or to even have critics in place in case they did. The result was a gross 
error in reporting the winner of the most important election in the United States. And by 
not clearly reporting the source of their data and failure to consult other sources, Konner, 
Risser, and Wattenberg found that CNN and others violated their journalistic 
commitment to viewers.117 CBS was also cited in the report as failing to check other 
sources of election data, showing that 24-hour news stations were not alone in their 
journalistic failures. Network news channels were equally to blame.  
 Even though 24-hour news may not have had the prestige of the long established 
broadcast news stations, they ultimately determined events reported during the evening. 
CBS officially paired with CNN to jointly decide the most important information of the 
election evening: when to declare a winner. FOX News was also influential that evening; 
arguably the most influential because it made the final Florida call for Bush. A 24-hour 
television news channel, with possible political motives and certain conflicts of interest—
as George W Bush’s cousin John Ellis was the one in charge of the election desk—made 
the initial call for Bush to be handed the presidency. Of course, this call was not 
technically official, but that did not slow the speed at which this unverified information 
spread. Within five minutes every television news outlet, both 24-hour cable news and 
broadcast networks, corroborated the story and effectively defined Bush as the winner in 
the public psyche. So much so, in fact, that by 3:00 a.m. Gore called Bush and gave up 
the race. Even the two most important men in the country at that moment based their 
decisions on the actions of one 24-hour news network: FOX News.  
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 But of course Bush had not decidedly won Florida, and this was not the first time 
that the news networks had miscalled the state. CNN miscalled Florida in favor of Gore 
earlier on Election Day at 8:00 p.m. and then recalled that report two hours later.118 But 
this miscall did not have the same effect of the later one; this is because the second call 
effectively determined the outcome of the race. Bush had won, it was believed, and for 
over an hour and a half this was accepted as truth. To make the claim seem even more 
legitimate was the fact that Gore conceded. Everything seemingly fell into place. The 
narrative of the evening, and of the election, ended. But neither candidate had officially 
won yet. This mistake mattered because it defined the narrative of the long public battle 
to determine the actual winner of the election and America’s next president. Bush had a 
much better public position, perceived as the winner, while Gore was the sore loser. It 
wasn’t until 3:40 a.m. that Gore called Bush to say he was back in the race, and then it 
wasn’t until 3:57 that CNN finally decided to retract the earlier claim that Florida had 
gone for Bush.119 Bush had “won” for two hours by that point. Gore’s concession and 
Bush’s apparent victory were strongly supported by this perception, which was cemented 
by the false reports stemming from FOX News and echoed on every other news channel.  
 24-hour news channels CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News were not second tier news 
sources during the 2000 election; they were plainly equals because of their ultimate 
influence of the evening’s events. Yet their actions, along with the established television 
news sources, interfered with the function of one of America’s most important 
democratic systems. As Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg concluded, “presidential 
elections are too sacred a part of our democratic system” to take risks in reporting 
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possible inaccurate election results. “[A]s Florida showed,” they said, “a few votes can 
mean a great deal.”120 
 
 
2. But, That’s What She Said 
 
 During presidential Election Night coverage in 2000, television news networks 
misreported the winners of statewide races a handful of times. The critical mistake was 
miscalling the Florida race, which gave Bush the apparent lead he needed in the Electoral 
College to become the next President of the United States. Despite the misreporting, 
actual vote counts in the state were not in question on Election Night, although they 
eventually would be. The Voter News Service misreported the actual numbers and those 
mistakes were simply repeated by news channels. As soon as the errors were recognized, 
news channels reported the updated information. Correcting the errors in reporting would 
seem to be the way to fix the problem. But television news trigged a social phenomenon 
called an “availability cascade” in the early morning of November 8th, 2000, which 
ultimately changed the course of the presidential election.  
 An availability cascade is one way that information is spread throughout groups 
of people. Availability cascades were postulated by Timur Kuran, an Economics 
professor at the University of Southern California, and Cass Sunstein, a professor in the 
Law School and Political Science Department at the University of Chicago.121 They 
applied the idea of availability cascades to many broad social and political trends. Kuran 
and Sunstein suggested it was the driving force behind such widespread movements such 
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as McCarthyism’s rise and fall, the fall of communism, the prevalence of smoking, and 
support for religious conservatism.122  
 Two psychological ideas combine to form availability cascades. The first, called 
the “availability heuristic,” describes an important process by which people make 
decisions about information they feel is true. People are more likely to accept information 
as true if the experience that led them to believe the information can easily be recalled. 
Simply put, the more examples someone can think of, the more likely something is to be 
accepted.123 The availability heuristic is combined with an “informational cascade,” 
which occurs when people who don’t have all of the information on a certain topic fill in 
their knowledge gaps with what they perceive other people believe to be true. If there 
similarities exist in the amount and type of information that people have in a population, 
as well as similarities in the lack of certain information, then ideas that fill in these gaps 
can be passed quickly within a group. This is what a cascade is, the rolling acceptance of 
new information. “Jumping on the bandwagon” or “snowballing” are other ways to 
describe this process.124  
 If all prerequisites are in place for availability cascade to happen, then ideas can 
spread extremely quickly throughout a population, essentially becoming an accepted part 
of the public consciousness. However, there is no qualification that the shared 
information must be correct; availability cascades simply explain how it is shared. 
Sometimes false information can be spread in this way.125 And in some cases, say Kuran 
and Sunstein, the “mass delusions” that result from availability cascades are never 
corrected.126  
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 Kuran and Sunstein explained availability cascades could create drastic problems 
in a democracy if the results of democratic processes spread by cascades, like elections 
and policymaking, rely on information that isn’t true. Because availability cascades can 
spread untrue information they could dangerously interfere with the public 
consciousness. As a result Kuran and Sunstein acknowledged a dual role of responsibility 
for ability cascades, between both the people who report a specific piece of information, 
like 24-hour news networks, and the people who accept the information and spread it.127 
Availability cascades, of course, are nothing new. What is new about these social 
phenomena is the speed at which they can happen thanks to technology. The 2000 
election revealed an ability that can “overwhelm governments” much faster than ever 
before.128 
 Knowledge of availability cascades is crucial to understanding the importance or 
24-hour television news. Millions of people watch 24-hour news, which is presented as 
factual. There are also relatively few channels: CNN, MSNBC, FOX News, and CNBC 
which focuses solely on financial news (but will not be addressed in this study). As 
discussed earlier, these channels are constantly competing to be the first source to provide 
viewers with information, which equates to increased viewership and profits for the news 
organization’s parent company. Competition requires that speed is emphasized, and an 
increase in speed heightens the chance of reporting incorrect information. If incorrect 
information is reported inadvertently as factual and exposed to millions of people, who in 
turn will share it with others who did not see the news program, then they will 
nevertheless believe the information. Widespread belief in the incorrect information will 
also pressure others into believing the information by default, and at this point the 
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incorrect information becomes truly widespread and broadly accepted as fact; an 
availability cascade has occurred. 24-Hour news, then, is such a powerful platform for 
triggering availability cascades both factual and false. It is essentially an omnipresent 
knowledge source in society with millions of viewers, and stiff competition means a 
constant race to break news faster than fact checking can allow.  
 A massive availability cascade occurred during the 2000 presidential election. 
Within five minutes, all national television news channels accepted the incorrect 
information that Bush won Florida, and therefore was the next President of the United 
States. They then shared this “fact” with millions of viewers, and in turn increased social 
pressure to accept the idea. Even at such a late hour many viewers watched, as this was a 
tight race with a lot at stake—clearly important news. So despite the short amount of time 
that Bush was purported to be the President the majority of the American population, 
although the information was incorrect, accepted it as truth. This cast Gore as the race’s 
loser, especially since he had acted on this same widely accepted incorrect information by 
officially conceding the race to Bush.  
  The CNN investigators came to this conclusion as well. Without directly citing an 
availability cascade as a cause, Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg suggested that when 
television news outlets proclaimed Bush the winner, the perception of this incorrect fact 
persisted during the resolution of the election in the Supreme Court. Al Gore was cast as 
a “sore loser” who was illegitimately challenging Bush’s win.129  Of course in reality, 
Bush had not won the election, as the votes legally had to be recounted to determine the 
rightful winner.  
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3. Jon Stewart is Onto Something 
 
 After the election, The Daily Show did not stop satirizing 24-hour television news. 
Far from it—they began targeting it more. But they not only satirized the handling of the 
2000 presidential election, they began to mock the way news channels actually reported.  
 In a clip from the show aired on November 13, 2000, during the election recount 
debacle, The Daily Show correspondents Steve Carell and Stephen Colbert reported on 
the most current recount news. Stewart began: “Now today, a federal court refused to 
grant an injunction to stop the manual recount in Florida. But it may be a moot point, if 
Florida’s Secretary of State enforces the Tuesday 5:00 p.m. deadline on the recount. 
Veteran correspondents Stephen Colbert and Steve Carell have been following this story 
for us; we are going to go to Steve Carell now in Washington. Steve, you’re a lifelong 
Democrat, what’s your take on all this?”  
 “Jon, hand recounts are fully authorized under Florida law and in the laws of 
many other states, including Texas” Steve responded from in front of a suspiciously large 
picture of the White House. “It’s far more important to get it done right, than to get it 
done quickly. How can—anyone—argue with that?” 
  Stephen Colbert cut in: “Jon, if I could just jump in here…”  
 “Uh yes,” Steward replied, “we’re going to go to Stephen Colbert, very active in 
the Republican Party, he’s down in Palm Beach County. Stephen.” 
 “Jon,” Colbert said, in front of a sunny Florida setting, “we had a count, and then 
a recount. Hand counting ballots invites both human error and political mischief. 
Elections happen on Election Day.” 
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 “Well what about this weekend, when we learned that George W. Bush moved 
ahead of Al Gore in New Mexico—after a hand recount?” Stewart asked. 
 “Jon, hand recounts are fully authorized under New Mexico law, and in the laws 
of many other states, including Florida. It’s far more important to get it done right, than 
to get it done quickly. Hard to argue with that.” 
 Carell butted in, “Jon—Jon if I might.” 
 “Yes” Stewart replied. Video feeds of Stephen Colbert and Steve Carell were now 
both on the same screen, in a similar style to many news shows.  
 “New Mexico had a count, and then a recount” Carell explained. “Hand counting 
ballots invites both human error and political mischief. Elections happen on Election 
Day.” 
  “Uh,” Stewart said, slightly confused at the apparent hypocrisy of their positions, 
“um, what are both sides making of the fact that Al Gore is, is clearly still winning the 
popular vote?” 
 Carell replied, “That’s a good point Jon. Al Gore received two hundred thousand 
more votes—he’s undoubtedly the peoples choice.” 
 “Jon,” Colbert cut in again, “those numbers are misleading. I could just as easily 
say that George W. Bush is two hundred thousand under par. Which, if you know 
anything about golf, means that George Bush is the winner. I say give him the green 
jacket.” 
 “Gore is taller,” Carell quipped.  
 “‘B’ comes before ‘G,’” Colbert quipped back, “are you denying this countries 
God-given right to alphabetize?” 
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 “Shut up!” said Carell, getting ever more agitated.  
 The shot cut back to Stewart, who was trying to keep the conversation from 
degrading into a yelling match. “Well, uh, alright, fellows, let me, let me just ask you 
this, this is—in, in your opinions, will this ever be decided?  
 When the video cut back to the correspondents, Carell and Colbert were grappling 
between their respective video feeds, clearly making fun of the fact that neither of them 
was actually in the location where they appeared to be. 
 “Alright,” finished Stewart, “we’ll be back.”130  
 Carell and Colbert’s exchange was not specifically making fun of any particular 
mistake of television news. Rather, it satirized the style of television news discourse as a 
whole. Often news programs invite pundits with opposing viewpoints onto the show to 
discuss an issue. And because conflict is entertaining to watch—whether or not it 
contributes to the public discourse—the pundits are not stopped if they start yelling at 
each other instead of politely advocating their point of view. The Daily Show took this 
common occurrence and extrapolated it to emphasize the pettiness of fighting in the first 
place. It begged the question of the viewer: can anybody agree to disagree on television 
news? This segment was also self-deprecating of The Daily Show by making it painfully 
obvious that Stephen Colbert and Steve Carell are not in their reported locations. The 
Daily Show was “fake” news, after all.  
 But despite the show’s fakeness, it followed the major news trends of the day. 
When the Supreme Court rendered the outcome of the 2000 presidential election, The 
Daily Show covered it. On December 13, 2000, Jon Stewart reported on how the major 
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news networks handled the reporting of the final presidential election results, the 
outcome of the court case Bush v. Gore.  
 “The ruling was a spectacular thing to behold, actually,” Stewart began, “the 
decision was handed down in a matter befitting the stature and reverence this nation holds 
for our Supreme Court.”  
 The shot cut away from Stewart to a video of MSNBC’s live coverage from the 
night before; someone ran across the steps of the courthouse, skipped daintily down the 
top steps before hopping squarely down the last few, then passed off the Supreme Court 
brief to the reporter like a baton in a relay race.  
 Stewart remarked, “By the way, I’m going to guess that guy, uh, that guy’s an 
intern.”  
 “Reporters from all the networks struggled to interpret the minutia,” he continued; 
the clip then showed two reporters for CBS quickly struggling to decipher the meaning of 
the wordy court decisions. One anchor simply standing, staring at it without saying 
anything, was given a fake mental voice over by The Daily Show suggesting that he was 
trying to avoid talking while putting up the appearance of being deep in thought about the 
newest revelation in the story.  
 Stewart then turned to The Daily Show’s own correspondent, Steve Carell, who 
was in front of an almost realistic courthouse backdrop deep in thought, pouring over the 
same Supreme Court brief.  Stewart attempted to ask for clarification on the ruling but 
was shushed by Carell, who then told someone off camera that he would like to order the 
“general Gao’s chicken.” He had not yet gotten the brief and had nothing to report.131 
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 Again, The Daily Show made a mockery of the stature assumed normal by news 
outlets. They showed the laughable way in which correspondents hurriedly tried to report 
the news. Instead of waiting ten minutes to form a constructive analysis of the situation, 
MSNBC had someone practically run a relay race to get the information to their reporter, 
who then stumbled through the dense content. In Steve Carell’s segment as well, The 
Daily Show satirized the inability of the CBS News reporters to readily provide 
meaningful analysis on a complicated issue, obviously rushed to reporting in an effort to 
get the news first. Again, the replaying of the actual clips to show how ridiculous news 
organizations are acting makes the critique especially sharp.  
 The overall media critique by The Daily Show in its early years starting in 2000 
composed a small portion of the shows overall comedy, which relied more heavily on 
jokes about the contents of the news. Nevertheless this critique was the first major 
incident that the program covered in which the program clearly criticized the media itself. 
The Daily Show would slowly begin to increase this critique over time until it became a 
main staple of the show’s content, along with satirizing politicians and government 
policies. In both clips The Daily Show was not simply making fun of particular instances 
where the television news channels made errors; it was making fun of how they handle 
things in general, the very practices that are considered by the stations themselves to be 
acceptable. The 2000 election was the beginning of the of The Daily Show’s media 
critique that would eventually become the program’s most valuable service. 
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4. Congress Concludes 
 
 Four months after the botched reporting of the 2000 election, Congress opened an 
investigation to discover what exactly went wrong. The Daily Show reported on the 
testimony of the news channel CEOs before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. During the show on February 15, 2001, Jon Stewart reported: “The botched 
handling of the 2000 election by the major TV networks was the hot topic on Capitol Hill 
yesterday, so for the one thousandth two hundred and forty third time, we’re going to go 
to our continuing coverage of,”—he said in an exasperated monotone—“Indecision 
2000.”  
 “Yes,” he continued, “the network’s premature calling of Florida on Election 
Night faced major congressional scrutiny Wednesday, as TV executives testified before a 
House committee, about the egregious errors made during Election Night. The networks 
did apologize for the mishandling, and then, out of habit, promised to hire more 
minorities.” The crowd laughed.  
 “The networks did pledge to impose self limits on calling elections, with CBS 
vowing to describe future close races using a new category, called leaning—that’s true—
leaning. It’s a term Dan Rather will undoubtedly end up calling ‘crookeder than 
grandpa’s shillelagh in a bar full of hunchbacks.’ He’s prone to colorful language.” 
 Stewart continued, “CNN chairman Tom Johnson struck a defensive pose: ‘I am 
very proud of the hundreds of CNN journalists, who devoted their efforts to informing 
the American public about the issues of this last election.’ Johnson added, ‘pardon my 
voice,” Stewart said, poking fun at Johnson’s incredibly deep voice while pretending to 
be him, “‘but this morning I swallowed CNN’s Bernie Shaw.’”132 Once again, The Daily 
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Show made fun of the major news networks failings and general practices, like promising 
to increase diversity. It also was reiterating the importance of television news’ civic 
responsibility by continuing to bring up stories about their mistakes.  
 The Congressional Hearings, entitled Election Night Coverage By The Networks, 
were also critical of the way the reporting of the 2000 election was handled by the major 
television news networks, although their critique was more serious in nature than that of 
The Daily Show’s. The investigation did not end up changing media policy; it only 
elicited apologies and promises of more reliable reporting from all of the networks, both 
broadcast and cable, for the public record. However, there were statements made by 
Representatives and the president of FOX News that raised questions about media ethics 
and responsibly.   
 At one point Representative Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California, stated 
that “The networks have a fundamental obligation to give us unbiased and accurate 
information at all times and particularly when they are reporting election results.”133 This 
comment is indicative of the widely held perspective of news organization’s 
responsibilities, but it seems to neglect the very real economic pressures of running a 
major news conglomerate. Especially with the charge that news should be “unbiased.” 
Although a free press performs the crucial role of informing citizens of the issues of 
government in democracy, the American press has not been unbiased historically. Rather, 
they were honest about their political bias.  
 Representative Diana DeGette, a Democrat from Colorado, also raised an 
important question in the congressional record. She said of the election result problems, 
especially in regard of the race to get information to the public, that: 
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…I don’t think this is a problem solely of the media. I think it’s just as 
much a problem of ourselves, the public. I would suggest that we as 
citizens of this country victimize ourselves by our own need for urgency. 
In this era of rapid communication and the insatiable need for instant 
information, there are times when I think we need to pause and evaluate 
the risks inherent in our demands to get access to information. That’s not 
something the media can do by itself. That’s something the citizens of this 
country need to decide for themselves.134 
 
The level of public involvement versus news channel involvement in the example of the 
2000 election is an interesting question. How much did news media outlets responding to 
public demand for immediate information, to the point that a winner in a state election is 
called before people have even stopped voting as in the case of Florida in 2000? 
Certainly news outlets needed to report necessary public information, but this race to be 
first has also meant that it is impossible for a news organization not to report as fast as 
possible—it simply would not be competitive with other organizations that valued speed.  
 The 2000 election also showed that even if people were willing to wait for 
accurate information, this desire was completely ignored by television news outlets. And 
because they all reported the same incorrect findings and triggered an availability cascade 
with the information that George Bush won the election, it doesn’t matter what other 
slower news sources were reporting; because the major sources reported the same thing, 
their facts, although incorrect, ultimately set the tone of public discourse on the subject 
and effectively overpowered contradicting reports. In this instance, there was no way the 
public could have influenced the news reporting. Perhaps in the long run it could be said 
that the desire for information from the public has increased the speed in delivery of 
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news, but this is ultimately an economic response because the first outlet that provides 
breaking news will get the most viewers and advertising revenue. 
 The most pertinent bit of testimony from the hearings was that of Roger Ailes, the 
president of FOX News. They were the first network to call Florida for George W. Bush, 
which all of the other major networks soon followed. Ailes blameed the ultimate mistake 
on incorrect data. “As everyone knows,” he said, “Voter News Service, a consortium 
with a good track record, gave out bad numbers that night. In the closest race in history 
the wheels apparently came off a rattle trap computer system which we relied on and paid 
millions for.” He continued, “As FOX relied on those numbers, we gave our audience 
bad information. Our lengthy and critical self-examination shows that we let our viewers 
down. I apologize for making those bad projections that night. It will not happen 
again.”135 Essentially he laid blame solely on the Voter News Service for FOX’s bad call. 
But although VNS did send out incorrect data, they never actually made a prediction on 
who would win. FOX News did that. And along with all of the other news stations, FOX 
was using VNS as the sole source for election data. All of these news channels were at 
fault to a great degree for relying on a single source for all of their election information; 
so the fact that VNS provided incorrect data did not mean that there was no other way for 
the news channels to provide the voter accurate information. FOX had poorly chosen to 
rely on a single source.  
 Ailes also spoke of the intense competition between the news networks. “We are 
all competitors,” he said, “and in some cases we don't agree on issues and in other cases 
we are not even that fond of each other. However, we all understand the importance of 
our respective journalistic enterprises and journalistic integrity.”136 It appears honorable 
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that Ailes confirmed FOX’s adherence to journalistic ethics. But it must not be forgotten 
that he is also the president of a company owned by a publicly owned parent company, 
News Corporation. His job, on the most basic level, is to ensure that FOX News is a 
profitable business. Ethical journalism does not matter if a news corporation ceases to 
exist because of lack of revenue; there would be no journalism to be unethical. 
 He then spoke for all of the networks when he said that “Everything our 
organizations did on Election Night was done under the protection of the First 
Amendment, and that may become more relevant as these discussions and questions 
continue.”137 Ailes attempted to use the First Amendment as blanket protection for what 
the news channels are doing. He did not clarify whether or not he invoked the freedom of 
speech or the freedom of the press, or both, to justify the reporting on Election Day. Yet 
Ailes did admit: “I do believe that democracy was harmed by my network and others on 
November 7, 2000. I do believe that the great profession of journalism took many steps 
backward.”138 It is a tenuous argument to suggest that what occurred during the election, 
a mass misreporting of information that interfered with its eventual outcome, should be 
unquestioningly protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. Because of the 
speed and reach of 24-hour television news, the most fundamental American democratic 
process was corrupted. Technology outpaced the speed at which the government could 
effectively function.   
 The FOX News president too mentioned that journalism as a profession “took 
many steps backward” during the reporting of the 2000 election. Yet much of this lack of 
adherence to established journalistic ethics was done by FOX News with the employment 
of John Ellis to make the decision on when to call a winner in a particular state. John 
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Ellis was George W. Bush’s first cousin, which created a potential conflict of interest 
between his family and accurate reporting. In his prepared statement to be entered in the 
congressional record, Ailes referred to Ellis’ family connection and stated “I do not see 
this as a fault or shortcoming of Mr. Ellis.” He then went on to say that “To be clear, 
there was no information which John Elis could have given to anyone nor was there any 
unilateral decision which Mr. Ellis could have made which would have affected the 
outcome of the election.”139 But while Ailes’ explanation seemed satisfactory at first 
glance, he did not mention Ellis’ own proclaimed political stance, and also did not clarify 
exactly how much sway he had over making the final call for Bush. Ailes’ claims came 
from information found during an internal investigation of FOX’s performance on 
election night, of which the investigators and ultimate findings were not released. It is 
dubious to trust these claims, as FOX had less incentive to be honest in the report because 
it was not released to the public. 
 In a letter sent to Joan Konner after the hearings by a ranking Member of 
Committee Representative John Dingell, Democrat from Michigan, asked her opinion on 
the ethics of allowing John Ellis to play a key role in calling the election. Dingell cited an 
article written by Ellis when he was a correspondent for the Boston Globe earlier in the 
campaign in which he stated "I am loyal to my cousin, Governor George Bush of Texas. I 
put that loyalty ahead of my loyalty to anyone else outside my immediate family… there 
is no way for you to know if I am telling you the truth about George W. Bush's 
presidential campaign because in his case, my loyalty goes to him and not to you [the 
Globe]."140 Joan Konner responded that she “would judge that to be not only a perceived 
conflict-of-interest but a real conflict-of-interest for a journalist.” She went on to say that 
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while someone with Ellis’ relationship should not be unequivocally prevented from being 
a journalist, citing examples of conflicts of interest handled ethically, but “the news 
organization [employing them] should take every precaution against placing such an 
individual in an assignment that could result in bias in reporting.”141 Ellis had also 
previously pledged allegiance to family over his employer when he worked at NBC 
before this during the 1998 election of George H. W. Bush, saying he was loyal “to my 
uncle, not to NBC News."142 But then he was providing commentary in this case rather 
than election decisions, unlike his decision role for FOX News in 2000. 
 24-Hour television news played a major role in the 2000 presidential election by 
reporting misinformation multiple times, most egregiously in the call that George W. 
Bush won the office of the presidency. The widespread reporting of this misinformation 
triggered an availability cascade, which gave the perception of a Bush victory 
prematurely, and cast Gore as a sore loser in the resulting struggle to determine who had 
actually won the election. Elections are critical to American democracy; without being 
transparent and genuine, the very foundation of the United States Government—rule by 
the people—was challenged. On Nov. 8, 2000, 24-hour news compromised this. But the 
problems of the current state of the media, excessive speed in reporting over accuracy 
and the ever-present pressure to succeed financially, would not change after the 2000 
election. These problems persisted and began to affect the very policy-making process of 
the elected government. The final clip of The Daily Show on November 8th, 2000, with 
the election still undecided, eerily forecast the next major chapter in American politics: 
the Bush administration.  
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 “Welcome back to the program,” Stewart said, “the race for the Presidency of the 
United States of America: still open. Uh, we’ll be here as long as need be, although we 
will be taking a brief twenty-four hour break. But before we go, Governor Bush made 
some comments earlier this afternoon; here are his thoughts on the impending result…” 
The screen cut to a clip of Governor Bush who said, “‘the strength of our American 
democracy, was explayed [sic]—displayed—in this exciting election.’” Stewart 
concluded, “Governor Bush did go on to say, that this will all be cleared up by 
inaguralation [sic] day.” The crowd laughed and clapped as he continued. “From all of 
us…” he said over the applause, “from all of us here at Comedy Central’s news room: 
goodnight, and help us.” 143 Little did Jon Stewart realize the truth in his words, or that 
the events caused by the coming administration would skyrocket The Daily Show into the 
forefront of political satire and skeptical journalism in American media.  
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The Longer Than Expected War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nine days after September 11, 2001, President Bush received a letter urging him 
to adopt a wide set of specific policy goals for America in the burgeoning War on 
Terrorism. Capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden and his network of terrorists would be 
a crucial step, the letter argued, but only a small part of what the United States ultimately 
needed to accomplish: removing the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The letter explained 
the dire need for this to happen. Regardless of Hussein’s suspected support of Osama Bin 
Laden, it read, he must be removed from power; victory in the War on Terrorism hinged 
on it.144 
 The letter was signed first by William Kristol, the well-known conservative writer 
and commentator, and also contained the signatures of thirty other politically 
conservative thinkers, former policymakers, and media pundits.145 Together, this group of 
people made up an organization called the “Project for the New American Century.” 
Founded in 1997, the Project for the New American Century was technically a non-profit, 
“educational” organization chaired by Kristol. Its stated goal was to “promote American 
global leadership.”146  
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 American leadership was not something that had to be created, the Project for the 
New American Century contended, they saw it as merely having to be maintained. The 
Project’s “Statement of Principals” plainly contended that that as of the 1990s the United 
States was the “preeminent” nation in the world, due in large part to its victory in the 
Cold War.147 Continued and expanded world leadership therefore was an obvious goal, 
especially considering America’s influence over the events of the previous century. The 
group also had a specific take on historical events that shaped their goals. “The history of 
the 20th century” their statement continued, “should have taught us that it is important to 
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. 
The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American 
leadership.”148 This was an argument for preemption, using history as justification for 
attacking other countries before they could attack the United States. And in January of 
1998, the biggest threat identified by the Project was Iraq under the control of Saddam 
Hussein.  
 The Project for the New American Century viewed Iraq in the late 90s as the 
gravest hazard to face America since the Cold War’s end.149 The containment strategy 
used by the Clinton administration at that time went through United Nations sanctions, 
but the Project argued this was inefficient.150 In a letter to president Bill Clinton, project 
members advocated a much harder line:  
  
The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq 
will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the 
near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as 
diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam 
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Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of 
American foreign policy.151 
 
Removing Hussein from power preemptively through military force was the only viable 
option they saw. Inevitably this singular policy would have meant invasion and 
occupation. To the project this response was warranted, if not an utter necessity. It would 
also be an unprecedented shift in American foreign policy. But Hussein’s Iraq must be 
controlled through force for the safety of America, they argued. The threat of weapons of 
mass destruction, so the Project thought, must be neutralized preemptively because—
without a shadow doubt—Iraq would attack the United States.  
 Yet this policy of preemption against Iraq did not appear to have quite the support 
in 1998 that it later garnered in 2001. Only eighteen people signed this letter, and this did 
not even include the signatures of the original “Statement of Principals” for the 
organization. Granted, the policy was extreme; persuading the American people declare 
war unprovoked would have been an almost unimaginable task at this time, especially 
with Democratic President Bill Clinton committed to a drastically opposite policy.152 
While the subsequent letter to President Bush after 9/11 gained more support than earlier 
policy suggestions, it too did not contain the signatures of everyone who signed the 
original “Statement of Principals” or the letter to Clinton. In fact, a number of high 
profile Project members did not sign the letter.  
 By 9/11, these members of the Project for the New American century did not need 
to contact the Bush administration to advocate their policies; they were the Bush 
administration. Dick Cheney was the Vice President; I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby was the 
Chief of Staff to the Vice President; Richard Armitage was the Deputy Secretary of State; 
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John Bolton was the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security Affairs; Donald Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense; Paul Wolfowitz was 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Jeb Bush, though not technically in the administration, 
was the brother of the president. All of these people were original, or soon after, members 
of the Project for the New American Century. And in 2001, they were in extremely 
powerful positions to create and implement foreign policy. Their ultimate policy 
decisions mirrored those of the Project almost exactly; the only task left was to gain the 
support of the American people.  
 In the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush 
laid out the direction of the War on Terrorism. Five months earlier a terrorist organization 
called Al Qaeda, a group many Americans had never heard of, managed to attack New 
York and Washington D.C. on a scale unheard of since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Its 
success made Osama Bin Laden both a household name and a major target. The War on 
Terrorism intended to destroy the terrorist network and prevent subsequent attacks 
against America. The President alluded to the wider battle that evening, saying, “What 
we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror 
is only beginning.”153   
 A broader War on Terror, Bush contended, would be waged to “prevent regimes 
that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of 
mass destruction.”154 Iran and North Korea were both examples cited by the President, as 
they were pursuing nuclear enrichment programs in the hopes of gaining atomic 
weapons. But the foremost danger, claimed Bush, was Iraq. “Iraq continues to flaunt its 
hostility toward America and to support terror,” he said. “The Iraqi regime has plotted to 
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develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade.”155 This speech 
began the linking of Iraq with both weapons of mass destruction and terrorists. But by the 
end of foreign policy section of the address, Bush was not even mentioning terrorism: “I 
will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and 
closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.”156 The message presented by 
Bush was clear: Iraq was actively trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction and must 
be preemptively stopped, before it had the possibility of attacking the United States. This 
was the same policy that the Project for the New American Century advocated for, now 
being implemented rather than ignored.  
 The Bush Administration constantly repeated its message that Iraq had weapons 
of mass destruction, or WMDs, after this moment, and with repetition the Iraqi threat 
began to congeal in the minds of the American public. Administration officials repeated 
the claims about Iraq in speeches and then later in television interviews, resulting in the 
exposure of millions to the frightening rhetoric.157 There was also a lack of discussion 
about these claims in much of the news media both on television and off. An important 
reason for this was the widespread feelings of patriotism after the September 11th attacks. 
Any news program perceived as going against patriotic sentiment would lose viewers to 
other news sources that echoed their feelings. Fewer viewers would mean less advertising 
revenue, which ultimately leads to a decline in the business providing the news. 
Economic incentives were a major factor in the lack of questioning of government 
policies after 9/11.158 
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 By October 16, 2002, the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorist ties was echoed by Congress, which passed a resolution allowing Bush to 
proceed with military action against Iraq if deemed necessary by the President.159 Four 
months later in the 2003 State of the Union address, Bush again laid out the case for war 
against Iraq, this time with increasing detail. Hussein attempted to develop a nuclear 
weapon in the 1990s, Bush claimed, and according to the British government he tried to 
get uranium from Africa. Hussein also tried to purchase “high-strength aluminum tubes” 
that would help produce nuclear weapons.160 Bush claimed in addition that Iraq’s leader 
Saddam Hussein “aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.”161  
 Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, also made these claims in a presentation to 
the United Nations Security Council on February 6 in 2003. He offered what appeared to 
be more solid proof of Iraq’s weapons development programs and terrorist ties in an 
effort to convince the international community of the Iraqi threat.162 Despite this, many 
traditionally supportive nations still did not approve of U.S. military intervention. The 
presentation of clearer evidence also was challenging for the American media to question 
if it desired. News organizations were not willing to spend or did not have resources to 
validate these intelligence claims independently. And there were no reports by 
administration officials on record to suggest anything different than Bush’s claims. It was 
difficult enough to prove a negative in the first place, let alone major claims about 
national security. The result of these challenges was the continued reporting of the Bush 
administrations Iraqi policy without major questioning by news outlets in America.163 
  On March 18, 2003 the administration finally followed through with its promise 
to use military force to disarm Iraq. Bush gave a speech at the White House giving 
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Saddam Hussein forty-eight hours to leave the country before war would officially be 
declared. He claimed, “The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished 
the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.”164  
 On March 20, as the deadline for Hussein to leave Iraq passed, the United States 
officially declared war on Iraq. The U.S. began a massive aerial bombardment of Iraq 
soon after.165 The ultimate policy goal of the Project for the New American Century was 
finally realized. Saddam Hussein would be forcibly removed from power and his 
purported weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones, would be destroyed.  
 It took less than two months for U.S. solders to occupy Baghdad. President Bush 
officially declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on March 2, 2003. “The 
liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror,” he said, “We have 
removed an ally of Al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding.” 166 There was, 
however, no mention of weapons of mass destruction. And although it seemed as if the 
war was over, the administration’s press secretary Ari Fleischer clarified that Bush would 
not declare victory, “because pockets of resistance remain and some key missions are 
unfulfilled.”167 There was no word given on how long it would take for the war officially 
to end.  
 Over the next year as the occupation of Iraq continued, the Bush administration’s 
justifications for starting the war began to unravel. An Op-Ed piece printed in the New 
York Times on July 6, 2003, voiced the first major public critique of the reasons for 
invading Iraq. Joseph C, Wilson, an ambassador and foreign service officer, claimed that 
the Bush administration had knowingly misled the public in the 2003 State of the Union 
address by trumping up charges that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Africa. Wilson 
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backed his claim because he was the agent sent to investigate this supposed deal in early 
2002 and found no evidence of its occurance.168  
 The Bush administration dismissed his claims and attempted to make an example 
out of Wilson for speaking out against them. An unknown senior member of the 
administration leaked the classified information that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was 
an undercover CIA agent to a handful of journalists. A conservative columnist named 
Robert Novak, who wrote opinion articles for the Washington Post and had a position as 
a pundit on the CNN debate show Crossfire, published this information soon after. On 
July 14, Novak wrote a column dismissing Wilson’s evidence against the Bush 
administration, and casually mentioned that his wife was an undercover CIA agent.169 By 
revealing this information senior Bush administration officials broke a federal law against 
such disclosures, which was enacted in order to protect undercover agents from harm.170 
But although Novak’s leak may have intimidated other war critics from coming forward, 
it could not prevent the facts about the pretense of the Iraq invasion from getting out.  
 A year after the incident involving Wilson transpired, and year and a half after the 
beginning of the war, the two major justifications for invading Iraq were proven false. On 
June 14, 2004, the September 11 Commission stated that there was not a “collaborative 
relationship” between Saddam Hussein and the al Qaeda terrorist network.171 This went 
against all previous claims by the Bush administration dating back to the 2002 State of 
the Union address, invalidating one of the major pretenses of the Iraq War and 
vindicating administration critics. The other major pretense, that Iraq was stockpiling 
weapons of mass destructions and developing nuclear arms, was proved false four 
months later. On October 6, 2004, the highest-ranking American weapons inspector 
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searching for WMDs reported there had been no attempt to make or stockpile these 
weapons for twelve years. The same was true for an Iraqi nuclear program.172  
 These findings shattered the complete premise for Bush administration policies 
and those advocated by the Project for the New American Century. Saddam Hussein did 
not stockpile weapons of mass destruction, nor did he produce nuclear weapons. And the 
supposed link with al Qaeda was just a convenient way to garner support for invasion, 
because it to did not exist. The Iraq War cost thousands of American and Iraqis their 
lives, it cost America billions of dollars, and it tarnished Americas world image. All 
because of a handful of influential people determined to enact extreme foreign policy 
goals, regardless of evidence or lack thereof.  
 
 
1. Caught in the Crossfire 
 
 Just as during the 2000 presidential election, The Daily Show sharply satirized 
events surrounding the Iraq invasion. The Bush administration provided a limitless 
supply of material to be mocked, but the 24-hour news networks were once again the 
major recipients of Jon Stewart’s humorous critique. Much of it was directed towards the 
between-segment graphics used by 24-hour news channels to set the tone for following 
reports. After the case for war was made in the 2003 State of the Union address, Stewart 
described the graphics used by FOX News, CNN, and MSNBC as “dramatic, subtly 
jingoistic,” and with, “music to scare the hell out of you.”173 He then went on to joke that 
if war with North Korea were to happen, the cable networks wouldn’t know how to 
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handle creating graphics for a two front war, deciding they would go with the ambiguous 
“showdown with another country.”174 
 Stewart’s critique escalated as the war drew closer. After Bush gave a forty-eight 
hour deadline for the war to begin, the 24-hour news channels raised the intensity of their 
coverage to new heights, as did The Daily Show. On March 18, Stewart started the show 
off with yet another look at the pre-war graphics. “Uh, personally,” he began “I, I don’t 
know about you but, but in these times of crises I turn to, uh, the 24-hour news sources. 
That, that—that for me, is where I find out all that’s happening. And our benevolent 
friends at these 24-hour news channels have moved from missing-child-miraculously-
found-frenzy into full-blown-war-freak-out-mode, and I’m really pleased about it, um…” 
Stewart paused as the audience chuckled. “But which one of these 24-hour news 
networks has best exploited our emotional vulnerability so far?” He then played clips of 
CNN’s “Showdown Iraq” title screen bathed in hues of red, and FOX News’ 
omnipresent, on-screen terror alert level indicator. But MSNBC managed to beat out its 
rivals: “the award for most-useless-news-channel-dramatic-war-graphic goes to the least 
watched of all the news channels: MSNBC, for its scintillating deadline graphic!” The 
graphic consisted of an on-screen countdown clock to the end of Bush’s 48-hour invasion 
ultimatum.175  
 On day two of the invasion, Stewart made a promise to his viewers: “But we are 
at war and we here at The Daily Show will do our best to keep you informed of any, late 
breaking, uh, humor, we can find. Uh, of course, our show, obviously, is at a 
disadvantage compared to the other news sources that we are competing with,” referring 
to the 24-hour news networks, “uh, at a disadvantage in several respects. For one thing 
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we, uh, are fake…” The crowd laughed. “They are not. So in terms of credibility, uh, we 
are uh—well oddly enough we are about even; about even,” he said in all seriousness as 
the audience wildly cheered. “Doesn’t—doesn’t seem like it should be that way but, but it 
is. And of course in terms of airtime we are lagging behind the 24-hour networks by, uh, I 
guess about 23 and half hours. But we are going to do what we can” he promised, 
hammering his fist onto his desk.176 Stewart had humorously insisted that the 24-hour 
networks really only had about as much credibility as The Daily Show when it came to 
news, based on the amount of emotionalized hype before and during the war.  
 Stewart’s critique of 24-hour news continued after the Bush administration 
essentially declared the war over in March of 2004. High-profile voices, most notably 
those of Joseph Wilson and Richard Clark, a former terrorism czar, claimed that Bush 
ignored the threat of al Qaeda to focus unnecessarily on Iraq before September 11. The 
Daily Show reported Richard Clark’s media reception on March 29, 2004, highlighting 
Tim Russert’s use of the slang term “dissed” when asking how Clark felt after he had 
been criticized by the administration. And though that was a humorous moment, the real 
critique was saved for a journalist from CNN.  
 Stewart began: “But Russert’s unfortunate choice of words—paled—in 
comparison to Robert Novak’s analysis of the issue on the always-inciting Crossfire.”  
 The screen cut to a clip of Crossfire host Robert Novak asking Member of the 
House Rahm Emanuel about the interaction between Clark and Condoleezza Rice at the 
congressional hearings initiated after Clark’s criticism: “Congressman do you believe—
you’re a sophisticated guy—do you believe who [sic], watching these hearings, that Dick 
Clark has a problem with African-American woman Condoleezza Rice?”  
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  “Say—say that again?” Rahm responded, pressing the audio monitor deeper into 
his ear to make sure he didn’t misunderstand.  
 Stewart cut back in laughing. “Yes, Robert Novak, please, say that again?” 
 The tape of Novak continued: “Do you believe that Clark has a problem with this 
African-American woman—” 
 “No” Rahm interrupted. 
 “—Condoleezza rice?” Novak finished.  
 Rahm said again, “Bob gimme [sic] a break, no.”  
 “Wow,” said Stewart, the screen cutting back to him. “Who even knew this deck 
had a race card? Don’t you get it people? Civil rights activist Robert Novak is implying 
that Richard Clark was never interested in fighting terrorism, he just, hates, black 
people.” The crowd laughed and applauded. “That’s the thing about Novak, he’s all about 
fighting injustice. Whether he sees a white man attacking a black woman, uh, that’s when 
he’s got to say something. Or when he hears about a CIA agent still working under cover, 
he has to reveal that person,” referring to Joseph Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame. “That’s 
Robert Novak: a—douche bag—for liberty.” The crowd erupted with approval of the 
CNN pundit’s new nickname.177  
 A trend began for Stewart: every time Robert Novak said something newsworthy, 
which usually meant blatantly false assertions made on CNN’s Crossfire, Stewart 
referred to him as a “douche bag,” a slang term describing a loathsome or contemptible 
person, in The Daily Show’s report. He also mocked the show Crossfire in particular 
along with his usual critique of 24-hour television news. This criticism of Crossfire came 
to a head when Stewart was offered a guest appearance on the show in October of 2004. 
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Ostensibly the interview would feature Stewart’s recently released book, and discuss the 
ongoing 2004 presidential campaign. But the interview turned into something quite 
different than Crossfire presumably intended. Stewart seized a chance to critique 24-hour 
news directly to the source.  
 Crossfire began broadcasting live at 4:30 p.m. on October 15, 2004 as it did every 
other weekday. The show’s announcer started with the usual intro: “Crossfire: On the 
left, James Carville and Paul Begala; on the right, Robert Novak and Tucker Carlson. In 
the Crossfire: Jon Stewart.” And after the first segment, Begala and Carlson, who were 
hosts that day, moved on to the interview with Stewart.  
 Begala introduced Stewart and Carlson started asking him about the presidential 
race: “But of the nine guys running, who do you think was best. Do you think he was the 
best, the most impressive?”  
 “Uh, the most impressive?” Stewart asked, referring to the Democratic candiates.   
 “Yes.”  
 “Uh, I thought Al Sharpton was very impressive.” The crowd laughed. “Uh, I—I 
enjoyed, uh, his way of speaking. I think, oftentimes, the person that knows they can't 
win is allowed to speak the most freely, and uh, uh, because, otherwise, shows with titles, 
such as… Crossfire.” 
  “Crossfire,” Begala affirms. 
 “Or ‘Hardball’ or ‘I'm Going to Kick Your Ass’ or...” Stewart paused while the 
crowd laughed. “Will, will, will jump on it. In, in—in many ways, it's funny. An—and I 
made a special effort to come on the show today, because I have privately, amongst my 
 70 
friends and also in occasional newspapers and television shows, mentioned, uh, this show 
as being, uh, bad.” 
 The crowd laughed as Begala cut in, “We have noticed.” 
“And I wanted to -- I felt that that wasn't fair and I should come here and tell you that I 
don't -- it's not so much that it's bad, as it's hurting America.” 
 The crowd laughed again as Carlson tried to argue, “But in its defense...” 
 Stewart kept talking while Begala tried to jump in: “So I wanted to come here 
today and say... Here's just what I wanted to tell you guys.”  
 “Yes,” said Carlson, waiting for his reply.  
 “Stop,” said Stewart.  
 The crowd laughed as he continued, “Stop, stop, stop, stop hurting America.” The 
conversation returned to the presidential race, but Stewart again brought up Crossfire’s 
media role when he got a chance to speak: “See, the—the thing is, we need your help. 
Right now, you're helping the politicians and the, the corporations. And we're left out 
there to mow our lawns.”  
 “By beating up on them?” Begala asked. “You just said we're too rough on them 
when they make mistakes.”  
 “No, no, no, you're not too rough on them. You're part of their strategies. You are 
partisan, uh, what do you call it, hacks,” Stewart said, in a nonchalant voice. 
 This criticism did not sit well with Carlson, who brought up candidate John 
Kerry’s appearance on The Daily Show as an example of Stewart’s own lack of hard-
hitting journalism.   
 “And I'll tell you,” Carlson said. “When politicians come on...” 
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 “Yep,” said Stewart.   
 “It's nice to get them to try and answer the question. And in order to do that, we 
try and ask them pointed questions. I want to contrast our questions with some questions 
you asked John Kerry recently.”  
 Stewart answered, “If you want to—If you want to compare your show to a 
comedy show, you're more than welcome to.”  
 The crowd chuckled at this. And after another digression Stewart brought up his 
point again.  “You know it’s—it's interesting to hear you talk about my responsibility,” 
Stewart responded to Carlson’s snipe.   
 Carlson snidely commented, “I felt the sparks between you,” insinuating Stewart 
and Kerry were more than friendly.  
 Stewart ignored him, “I didn't realize that—and maybe this explains quite a bit.” 
 Carlson tried to cut in again but was unsuccessful.  
 Stewart continued, “... is that the news organizations look to Comedy Central for 
their cues on integrity.” 
 The crowd laughed again, and Stewart kept iterating this point, even through 
digressions and interruptions in the conversation. “But my point is this,” Stewart said. “If 
your idea of confronting me is that I don't ask hard-hitting enough news questions, we're 
in bad shape, fellows,” referring to Begala and Carlson. The crowd laughed.   
 “We're here to love you, not confront you,” said Carlson through the crosstalk. 
“We're here to be nice.” 
 72 
 “No, no, no, but what I'm saying is this,” said Stewart, “I'm not. I'm here to 
confront you, because we need help from the media and they're hurting us. And it's -- the 
idea is...” 
 The crowd applauded Stewart’s point and he continued:  “But the thing is that 
this—you're doing theater, when you should be doing debate, which would be great.” 
 Begala tried to respond, “We do, do...” 
 “It's not honest,” Stewart cut in again. “What you do is not honest. What you do is 
partisan hackery [sic]. And I will tell you why I—I know it.”  
 “You had John Kerry on your show and you sniff his throne and you're accusing 
us of partisan hackery [sic]?” Carlson asks.  
 “Absolutely.” 
 “You've got to be kidding me. He comes on and you...”  
 “You're on CNN,” said an exasperated Stewart, referring to the news network. 
“The show that leads into me is puppets making crank phone calls.” The crowd laughed 
as Stewart asked, almost yelling, “What is wrong with you?” 
 Once again, as was typical for Crossfire, the conversation digressed. But once 
again Stewart returned to his point, trying to get the hosts to acknowledge his perspective. 
“You know,” Stewart said through the crosstalk, “the interesting thing I have is—you 
have a responsibility to the public discourse, and you fail miserably.”  
 “You need to get a job at a journalism school, I think.” Carlson said.   
 “You need to go to one,” Stewart replied flatly, “The thing that I want to say is, 
when you have people on for just knee-jerk, reactionary talk...” 
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 “Wait. I thought you were going to be funny. Come on. Be funny,” Carlson 
interrupted.  
 “No. No. I'm not going to be your monkey” Stewart said to laughter.   
 Begala cut in, trying to let Stewart finish, “Go ahead. Go ahead.” 
 “Stewart continued, “I watch your show every day. And it kills me.”  
 “I can tell you love it,” says Carlson.  
 “It's so—oh, it's so painful to watch,” bemoaned Stewart, to more laughs in the 
audience. “Um, you know, because we need what you do. This is such a great 
opportunity you have here to actually get politicians off of their marketing and strategy.” 
 “Is this really Jon Stewart?” asked Carlson, having truly lost his control over the 
interview. “What is this, anyway?” 
 After another digression about the election Carlson jibed at Stewart, “I do think 
you're more fun on your show. Just my opinion.”  
 He then started to lead into the commercial break while Stewart, talking over him, 
responded sharply: “You know what's interesting, though? You're as big a dick on your 
show as you are on any show.”  
 The crowd laughed as Carlson, chuckling to himself, said, “Now, you're getting 
into it. I like that.” 
 “Yeah,” finished an irritated Stewart. And the interview ended.178  
 Jon Stewart’s appearance on Crossfire undoubtedly was the most blunt media 
critique of 24-hour television news possible. Stewart made his case not only on one of the 
networks, but as it was broadcasting—live. Viewers watching CNN that afternoon would 
not have to also watch The Daily Show to get a critique of 24-hour news.  
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  It was challenging for Stewart to say what he wanted cohesively, because the 
hosts, especially Carlson, tried to control the interview. But although Stewart’s message 
was punctuated by digressions at countless intervals, he managed to stick to his point. 
The overall premise of Stewart’s argument was laid out when he described the show not 
as being “bad,” but rather as “hurting America.” Stewart called Begala and Carlson 
“partisan hacks,” which are writers or journalists producing dull, but more importantly 
unoriginal work. Here he highlighted the very nature of Crossfire, the simple advocating 
for “left vs. white; black vs. white” as being a detriment to American political discourse. 
Instead of simply repeating political messages, which was entertaining but not 
constructive, the show should analyze and then debate different messages. All that 
Crossfire amounted to was “theatre,” which Stewart described as “not honest.”179 
 Tucker Carlson accused Stewart and The Daily Show of asking weak questions to 
presidential candidate John Kerry in his appearance on the program. Stewart countered 
this argument well by highlighting the fatal flaw in Carlson’s logic. “If you want to 
compare your show to a comedy show,” he said, “you're more than welcome to.” The 
Daily Show made no claim to be a news program and was always described as “fake” 
news or comedy. It acknowledges no responsibility to viewers except to be funny; 
Carlson’s journalistic critique of The Daily Show was simply irrelevant. It’s why Stewart 
said he didn’t realize “news organizations look to Comedy Central for their cues on 
integrity.” For the comedian, the legitimate 24-hour news network CNN should have 
strict journalistic standards because of its democratic responsibility; but in practice, 
Stewart implied, Crossfire placed a premium on entertainment from “knee-jerk, 
reactionary talk,” rather than reasoned discourse. Stewart drove this home by telling 
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Carlson bluntly to go to journalism school, suggesting Carlson had no understanding of 
journalistic ethics.  
 Stewart’s belief that media was responsible for upholding American democracy 
compelled his critique. “I'm here to confront you,” he said, “because we need help from 
the media and they're hurting us.” He went on to say at that Crossfire as a popular 
television show was “a great opportunity […] to actually get politicians off of their 
marketing and strategy.” This specific critique highlighted one of the more broad issues 
with news media: that it emphasized conflict and entertainment instead of contributing to 
the function of democracy in America. Stewart attacked the logic that the more 
entertaining the news, the more viewers it will attract. Crossfire was designed to be this 
type of show. And Stewart simply highlighted this fact—but on the program itself, where 
viewers were more likely to buy into the entertainment value without realizing it. Stewart 
also charged that while The Daily Show was obviously a comedy program, Crossfire 
flaunted itself as a debate show and yet only delivered reactionary political comments. It 
pretended to be a part of the legitimate discourse, as do all 24-hour news networks, when 
really it was entertainment based. The disconnect between the show’s presentation and its 
content was its most problematic aspect. Pretending to be logic, dispassionate analysis 
and objective, Crossfire delivered only bickering.  
 During this interview Stewart also identified the true target of The Daily Show’s 
satire. Rather than a specific political party, the “absurdity” of the whole political system, 
government and media were Stewart’s targets. That is why Crossfire was made fun of so 
prominently and had “been helpful” to The Daily Show. For Stewart, it was simply 
absurd.180   
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 Stewart addressed his appearance on Crossfire on The Daily Show’s first program 
after the interview. “Hello everybody” he started, “welcome to The Daily Show I’m Jon 
Stewart, uh, how—how’s, how was your weekend? I, uh, I uh, I had a great weekend, I 
uh, lets see what did I do on Friday, um, got a haircut, uh, called a guy a dick on national 
television…”  
 The crowd applauded wildly. Stewart then explained the thought behind his 
remarks during the interview. “…I had always in the past mentioned to friends,” he said, 
“and people that I meet on the street, uh, that I think that show [Crossfire], blows. So I 
thought it was only the right thing to do—is to go say it to them personally, uh, on their 
program. But here’s the thing about confronting someone with that on their show: they’re 
there.”  
 The crowd laughed as Stewart momentarily used a high-pitched voice, “Uh… 
Uncomfortable!”  
 He then returned to the explanation, “And they were very mad, because a—
apparently, when you invite someone on a show called ‘Crossfire’ and you express an 
opinion, they don’t care for that. Apparently my opinion was not—I’ve seen the show, all 
they do is express opinions, they just shout at each other. But apparently if that opinion is 
not one of your standard right-left opinions, it just—uuhhh!” He said feigning 
exasperation and throwing his hands up. “Uh, but they did uh—I told them that I felt their 
show was, uh, hurting America. And um, they came back at me pretty good, they said 
that I uh, uh, I wasn’t being funny.” The crowd laughed and said “aww.” Stewart 
continued, “And I said to them: I, I know that.” The crowd laughed again, “But tomorrow 
I will go back to being funny… and your show: will still blow.” The crowd went wild.181  
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 Overall Stewart was very nonchalant about the Crossfire episode, even when he 
talked about it on his own show. He did, however, reiterate the theatre-like nature of 
Crossfire, especially when he referred to its almost laughable title. And except for the 
moment that Stewart called Tucker Carlson a “dick,” his entire appearance was truly an 
honest attempt to get the people who are the face of the 24-hour television news networks 
to acknowledge what their impact on American society.  
 The impact of Stewarts’s appearance ended up being more that he had perhaps 
intended. Three months after his appearance, on January 6, 2005, the new head of CNN 
Jonathan Klein officially canceled Crossfire. Klein referenced Stewart’s appearance on 
the show and the criticisms he voiced saying, “I agree wholeheartedly with Jon Stewart's 
overall premise.” CNN, he said, was moving away from “head-butting debate shows.”182 
But in Stewart’s introductory monologue on The Daily Show that evening, he pointed out 
that even though Crossfire was cancelled, nothing had changed.  
  “…[I]t came to my attention,” Stewart began, “today over the wire service—
that’s what we call it in the news business: the wire service—uh, CNN’s much loved 
debate show Crossfire has apparently, uh, been cancelled.” He said, pretending to be sad, 
“I uh…” The audience hooted and cheered at the news. “So I guess news is, fixed? I had 
no idea that if you wanted a show cancelled, uh, all you had to do was say it out loud. 
[…] Uh, so I really showed them, uh, they’re—they’re cancelled and now, uh, Tucker I 
believe goes on to a prime time show at MSNBC and the other three guys go on to keep 
doing work at CNN, uh. So apparently, uh in the world of punditry—its like musical 
chairs, except uh, there’s the same amount of chairs as people. So uh, the music ends and 
everyone sits there and goes ‘what network should I go to now?’ 183 The cancellation 
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solved nothing for Stewart, as he noted the same people that hosted the show kept 
working in 24-hour news. His critique wasn’t only about Crossfire; it was about the 
whole 24-hour news system. Crossfire just stood out at that moment as emblematic of the 
meaning and irrelevant content of the news.  
 The Daily Show proved its social force with this interview. The show’s pertinent 
critique of Crossfire in particular tarnished the image of the show enough that it was 
cancelled. Stewart gained legitimate media influence with this moment. But indeed as he 
said, nothing had changed with 24-hour news, and the networks would soon find 
themselves in the middle of yet another reporting scandal.  
 
 
2. Smoking Guns  
  
 The Iraq War continued over two years after the Bush administration essentially 
declared victory in the conflict. And by April of 2006 there began to be serious criticisms 
of the handling of the occupation and rebuilding by a handful of well respected retired 
army generals. In what came to be called the “Generals’ Revolt,” six prominent generals, 
the most recently retired having led troops in 2004, collectively called for the resignation 
of Donald Rumsfeld, citing “his absolute failures in managing the war against Saddam in 
Iraq.” Not all of them considered the invasion itself to be unfounded, but they all did 
agree Rumsfeld and those under his charge ignored advice from Army commanders and 
interfered unwarrantedly with military decisions. The generals also voiced concern that 
the occupation of Iraq was slowly becoming an ever-lengthening responsibility of the 
United States with the cost placed heavily on the troops themselves.184  
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 To gain a better understanding of the generals’ claims, and to illuminate military 
and national security issues in general, news outlets customarily turned to retired 
members of the armed forces. Referred to as “military analysts,” the retirees appeared on 
24-hour cable news networks FOX News, CNN, and MSNBC, along with other media 
outlets. Their extensive military experience gave their information and analysis much 
needed depth to news coverage on challenging topics like the Iraq War. These analysts 
technically were consultants for 24-hour news networks, paid from between $500 and 
$1000 per on air appearance.185  
 Bush administration officials such as Rumsfeld saw the “Generals’ Revolt” as a 
major threat to the American public’s support of their policy goals in Iraq. But they 
already had a system in place ready to neutralize criticism against the administration and 
its policy goals. It hinged on the military analysts employed by the 24-hour news. 
 Torie Clarke, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, started this 
media response system in the early months of 2002. She previously was an executive in 
public relations, and had specific plans for obtaining “information dominance,” 
essentially influence over the public debate, by the Pentagon on foreign policy issues. 
Clarke knew viewers were most likely to be persuaded by what they believed to be 
independent voices of authority when it came to news. Military analysts used by cable 
news networks were the ideal “key influential,” her term for these best possible 
independent voice. Clarke found that beyond providing factual information, military 
analysts framed news interpretations for viewers.  And although these analysts appeared 
on news channels they were not technically news employees or journalists. So in the 
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Pentagon’s view they were not bound by the normal journalistic ethics.186 They could, in 
effect, be propagandists.  
 The catch, however, was that these military analysts only needed to be perceived 
by viewers as knowledgeable as independent, regardless if they actually were. That’s 
where Ms. Clarke came in. She organized a group of around seventy-five retired officers 
working as military analysts for news organizations who were also sympathetic to Bush 
and Rumsfeld’s foreign policy goals. Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense courted 
them, in a sense, by making them feel like political insiders. Private meetings with the 
Secretary of Defense, personal notes of thanks from Rumsfeld, and reminders of their 
patriotic duty to America were all ways in which these analysts were influenced in lieu of 
money. There were also special briefings by Dick Cheney from the White House and 
Alberto Gonzales from the Justice Department; analysts got special access to intelligence 
and carefully orchestrated tours of places like Guantanamo Bay prison and Iraq. In return 
many of these military analysts became regular and public advocates of Bush 
administration foreign policy on 24-hour news channels. The only requirement laid down 
by the Department of Defense was that analysts never reveal this relationship to the 
Pentagon; it remained hidden from news channels and especially viewers.187   
 There was another relationship many of these military analysts kept from news 
channels and viewers: ties to military contractors who stood to profit greatly from 
government contracts during the Iraq War and occupation. The positions with military 
contractors held by some of these analysts included lobbying jobs, consulting roles, seats 
on the boards of defense contractors, and even senior executive positions. Maintaining 
close relationships with higher ups in the Department of Defense, including those with 
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power to direct contracts was profitable. Analysts could curry favor repeating Department 
of Defense talking points; the reward could be millions of dollars in contracting work. 
Some generals admitted to knowingly passing on overblown evidence to avoid losing 
contracts. Military analysts who stood to gain monetarily from work with the Pentagon 
also benefited by ongoing involvement in Iraq, because an expanded conflict meant 
continued opportunities for profit. And although some analysts did eventually show 
remorse for knowingly misleading news viewers and the public at large, their apologies 
came long after the Bush administration had achieved its goal of invasion.188  
 The first test of media analyst system came after September 11 in early 2002 and 
was quite successful. Bush administration officials wanted to shift the national focus of 
foreign policy from terrorism towards Iraq, mirroring the longstanding goals of the 
Project for the New American Century. Polls indicated, however, that significant 
numbers of Americans were not convinced of this idea, mainly since there was no clear 
connection between Iraq and 9/11. Torie Clarke used the military analysts employed by 
24-hour news channels and other news outlets as the answer to this problem. Members of 
this analyst network received talking points echoing the rhetoric of President Bush and 
other high-ranking administration officials. The analysts cast Iraq as the biggest threat the 
U.S. due to its weapons of mass destruction and budding nuclear program. Analysts also 
claimed that Iraqi partnership with al Qaeda was a distinct possibility. This strategy 
worked extremely well; Pentagon supported military analysts repeating Bush 
administration talking points were perceived as independent voices. The administration’s 
message spread effectively, and although it turned out to be factually incorrect, it 
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galvanized a large segment of the American population to support the President’s policies 
and ultimately the invasion of Iraq.189  
 Despite the defeat of Iraq’s army by the summer of 2003 the beginnings of an 
insurgency in Iraq began. This led to a growing number of negative reports from 
journalists about the American occupation of Iraq as a whole, and once again the Bush 
administration needed to counter these reports to ensure continued support for their own 
policies. Military analysts were again at the forefront of the Pentagon’s media push for 
support. A Pentagon memorandum on the media strategy called them “message-force 
multipliers,” which describes the analysts perfectly: individuals that can increase the 
force of the Pentagon’s message by multiplying the number of people who repeat it. 
These military analysts were given special tour of Iraq in soon after the insurgency began 
to help counter negative journalistic reports; this was intended to help the request from 
the Bush administration to Congress for $87 billion more to help with longer than 
expected American occupation.190   
 The administration next used these “message-force multipliers” to counter 
legitimate criticisms by retired generals of Rumsfeld’s handling of the Iraq occupation. 
The “General’s Revolt” fully erupted by April 14, 2006 with a front-page article in the 
New York Times reporting the story. That same day, Rumsfeld organized a meeting of 
usual sympathetic military analysts; members of the Pentagon also helped two generals 
who worked for Fox News to craft a defense of the Secretary in an opinion piece 
published in the Wall Street Journal. Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation owned both 
news outlets, and this clear example of cross promotion shows the danger in news media 
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conglomeration. Single ideas can be echoed by sources that appear independent when in 
fact they are not, as was the case here.  
 On April 18, the Tuesday of the next week, Rumsfeld and then Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace briefed seventeen analysts on how to rebut 
criticisms of the Iraq War and drum up falling public support for the conflict. In a list of 
bullet points compiled about the meeting two messages were underlined, presumably 
emphasizing their importance. They were: “Focus on the Global War on Terror—not 
simply Iraq. The wider war—the long war,” and “Link Iraq to Iran. Iran is the concern. If 
we fail in Iraq or Afghanistan, it will help Iran.”191 The next goal for the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy had presumably been selected.   
 24-Hour news networks were ultimately responsible for spreading this false 
message because of their constant coverage of it, which was much longer than the 
broadcast networks. This is not to suggest a concerted effort by networks to put these 
analysts on air to spread Pentagon talking points. Rather, most news channels did not 
know what was going on, and didn’t bother to find out. This apathetic attitude toward 
journalistic standards also applied to the economic interests that some analysts had; news 
channels again didn’t bother to question conflicts of interest. In their view they didn’t 
have to. Analysts appearing on news networks were not required to disclose conflicts of 
interests. News networks instead presumed that the analysts themselves would disclose 
any conflicts of interest that violate journalistic ethics. 
  But even when journalistic ethics were plainly violated, such as when the 
Pentagon paid for military analysts to take commercial flights to Iraq for specially 
planned tours, 24-hour news networks did not object. And despite all of these 
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occurrences most news channels did not admit to any ethical violations. FOX News 
simply ignored accusations; NBC News, which owns MSNBC, did not reveal its process 
for vetting analysts. The one 24-hour news network that admitted a lapse in ethical 
standards was CNN; they did require other sources of income to be disclosed for analysts, 
but not to the same strictness as for legitimate journalists.192 
 There is also a question of the Pentagon’s understanding of this lack of 
accountability of news organizations. If they knew military analysts were not being 
vetted, and purposefully took advantage of this to disseminate administration talking 
points, this practice could count as propaganda. Legally the United States Government is 
forbidden from enacting psychological operations or propaganda against its own citizens, 
but it is allowed to engage in public affairs work.193  
 The Pentagon viewed the military analyst-briefing program as akin to embedding 
journalists with troops on the battlefield; the analysts were embedded with the top leaders 
of the Department of Defense in the same way. Viewed by Rumsfeld as “surrogates” and 
“message force multipliers” these analysts were hardly independent. Briefings for 
analysts were kept “off the record,” which meant they could not be disclosed to news 
channels. The mirrored business interests of these analysts also call into question the 
independence of their analysis.194  
 In presenting the Department of Defense’s views unchecked, 24-hour news 
channels violated their journalistic integrity. Had they adhered to ethical standards, there 
would have been a chance that the incorrect messages about Iraq before and after the war 
might not have been spread. This could have meant less public support for the Bush 
administration and a different possible outcome for the Iraqi invasion and post-war Iraq. 
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Maintaining journalistic standards in these instances would have been challenging, 
especially due to economic infused patriotic pressure and Pentagon secrecy, but this 
check is ultimately needed on government power for the American people. Without press 
being independent and ethical, the American people cannot truly participate in 
government as they were intended to.  
 It wasn’t until 2008—years after military analysts’ use—that the Pentagon’s 
strategy of “message force multipliers” was brought to light by the New York Times. 
Reporters began investigating in 2006, but it took those years to get 8,000 pages of 
documents released under the Freedom of Information Act. The Times ended up having 
to sue in federal court to obtain the documents, and as of 2008 the Pentagon still 
attempted to stall the release of more information.195 Bringing to light this practice, 
however, did force the Pentagon to end the program in April 2008. Congressional 
representatives were on the whole “very angry” about what the whole situation. 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Democrat from Missouri Ike 
Skelton, said, “The story does not reflect well on the Pentagon, on the military analysts in 
question, or on the media organizations that employ them.” Democrat Rosa L. DeLauro, 
from Connecticut, focused on the media’s failed responsibility in this affair: “When you 
put analysts on the air without fully disclosing their business interests, as well as 
relationships with high-level officials within the government, the public trust is 
betrayed.”196 The public trust certainly was betrayed, but in more reasons than everyone 
realized. Because of the particular ways that information spreads and is consumed by 
individuals, continuous television appearances by “message force multipliers” led to very 
specific occurrences in public perception of the Iraq War, both before, during, and after it 
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happened. Just as in the 2000 presidential election, an availability cascade occurred about 
the purported Iraq threat. The only difference between the two cascades: this one was 
intentional.  
 
 
3. I Believe  
  
 In the New York Times story revealing the Pentagon’s use of military analysts to 
echo Bush administration’s policies, the concerted use of “message force multipliers” 
was referred to as a “media Trojan horse.”197 This adequately described the hidden 
influence behind these media analysts, but it did not address what the Department of 
Defense really wanted to accomplish. Donald Rumsfeld did not want to infiltrate the 24-
hour news networks by using the military analyst strategy; the ultimate goal was to 
deposit information that supported administration policies into the minds of the American 
people. Creating belief was the Pentagon’s achievement. The 24-hour news networks 
simply were a means to an end, and they were just as effective at disseminating belief 
then as during the 2000 presidential election.  
 Instead of looking solely at the use of military analysts during the Iraq war, 
consider the broader view of Bush administration policy goals. Invading Iraq because of 
weapons of mass destruction was a policy goal in some form since the late 90s, but 
although a number of powerful people thought this necessary, a majority of citizens 
would not have been supportive of a preemptive war. After September 11 however, 
America became hyper conscious of foreign terrorist threats and receptive to action 
against them. This was the justification needed by the Bush administration convince 
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Americans of the Iraqi threat. But instead of being an accident due to hastened reporting 
as in 2000, the Iraq availability cascade was methodically produced. By the very nature 
of the television medium and belief creation the warnings about Iraq were potent and 
widespread, and ultimately succeeded in convincing much of the American public that 
Iraq was a threat to its safety.  
 Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, the scholars who identified the availability 
cascade phenomena, refer to those attempting to initiate a cascade as “availability 
entrepreneurs.” Essentially this term pertains to anyone who understands availability 
cascades and uses that knowledge to trigger them.198 This is the exact tactic Bush and his 
senior officials used after September 11 up until the invasion of Iraq. The threat of 
WMDs and al Qaeda ties was initially shared in major speeches like the State of the 
Union, and in addresses like that of Colin Powell to the United Nations. News networks, 
24-hour ones especially, repeated these messages as if they were fact, not having the 
resources to verify, or will to challenge, administration claims. Military analysts also 
repeated the Bush administration’s message—misleadingly—as independent information 
at the Pentagon’s request. In the end, the Bush administration achieved its goal of 
invading Iraq through triggering an availability cascade, an effort Kuran and Sunstein call 
an “availability campaign.”199 Through the Iraq War availability cascade, the Bush 
administration, acting as availability entrepreneurs waging an availability campaign, 
mobilized enough Americans to support invasion. The only problem was that the 
information disseminated was not true.  
 The fact that the Iraq availability cascade was planned seems less feasible than the 
accidental 2000 election availability cascade. During the election there was one false 
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claim, the Bush victory, which was reported based on a misreading of facts that happened 
literally overnight. The concentration on speed rather than accuracy led to an “availability 
error,” or a broad incorrect belief.200 The Iraq availability cascade did not occur 
overnight, but rather took a concentrated effort over the period of eight months. Factual 
errors would have been less likely to become beliefs. However this is not the case. The 
reason is that many journalists and news organizations rely on information provided from 
sources that have specific goals, and then report that information as if it is fact.201 This is 
exactly what news sources did during the lead up to the Iraq War with the Bush 
administration’s claims; they relied on official agendas for reports. And due to the 
economic incentives of the news outlets, especially 24-hour news, relying on this biased 
information is cheaper than researching hard news stories themselves. Before the Iraq 
war, fear of being labeled unpatriotic and losing viewers was also a concern. Citizens 
were therefore receiving administration messages about Iraq both from government 
leaders and news media, which were essentially echoing their claims. Adding to the 
broad acceptance of facts is that most people don’t have time or resources to 
independently assess government claims; that’s what objectivity in the press is for, an 
independent look at government and other institutions. So if people perceive news outlets 
to be objective they are simply restating facts designed to mislead, then acceptance by 
viewers is almost guaranteed. This is a major factor in how long term availability 
cascades of untrue information occur successfully.202 
 Responsibility of spreading availability cascades mostly falls on the news outlets 
that report information to begin with. But the other factor that makes availability cascades 
so potent is the next wave of people to learn about a certain fact does so from friends 
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rather than the original reporting source. Those who hear and share a fact reported in the 
news, and create social pressure to accept it, also share responsibility for causing 
availability cascades.203  
 The nuanced role of human interaction role highlights the importance of belief. 
Availability cascades depend on people believing what news sources and others tell them. 
To fully understand availability cascades, and the reason that people believed false 
information about Iraq, what beliefs actually are must be understood.  
  Gregory Lester, a practicing psychologist and PhD, concisely explained what 
belief actually is. The foremost function of the brain, he said, is to keep the body alive 
and running, even before maintaining consciousness. Comas are an example of this; when 
faced with a choice between maintaining consciousness versus maintaining blood flow, 
the brain will choose to keep the heart running. Every function of the brain, at its 
foundation, is based on survival.204 The brain’s senses are one of its main mechanisms to 
help the body survive. Threats are seen and heard, interpreted by the brain, and then 
reactions occur to protect the body from danger. But humans can only physically sense a 
very small portion of the world at a given moment, limited to what can be seen and heard 
in the immediate vicinity. If this were the only way that humans could perceive danger, 
then chances for survival would be diminished, because potential threats could not be 
anticipated.205  
 The ability to anticipate a threat is the reason belief is useful. Essentially beliefs 
let senses operate on a much larger scale than they are physically able. Lester described 
them succinctly as the “long-range danger detectors” of the brain; but they are not only 
limited to threats. He used leaving a car in a driveway as an example. If a person is inside 
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their house then they cannot immediately see, or sense, their car in the driveway. On a 
basic level, the car does not “exist” because the person cannot verify it with any of their 
senses. Yet they have a mental map of where the car is, and so believe it still sits in the 
driveway. It is in this way that people can know information that they can’t readily verify 
with sensory data. An example of where this would benefit survival is in a potentially 
dangerous situation. If someone were in jungle with no beliefs, relying only on what they 
could see and hear, then predators would have the advantage of taking them by surprise. 
But if someone with beliefs of possible dangers was in the same position, they can be 
ready to protect themselves even if threats are not apparent. Beliefs do not rely on what a 
person’s senses are reporting at any given moment, yet they still provide crucial 
information on survival.206  
 Since beliefs and senses evolved to be compliments, they are considered by the 
brain to both be equal sources of data related to human survival. Losing the ability to use 
either one would be detrimental and decrease the chances of survival greatly. Obviously, 
without the ability to sense it would be nearly impossible to react to immediate threats. 
And if a person could not believe in dangers existing outside the range of human senses, 
they would easily be overwhelmed by outside threats.207  
 Belief is knowledge that does not rely on sensory data, so beliefs intrinsically 
reject sensory evidence. They would not be useful if they accepted it.208 In the previous 
example, if someone in a jungle did not sense a threat, and this convinced their beliefs 
that there was none, they would once again be susceptible to dangers. A person’s beliefs 
must resist what sensory data tells them in some cases, for their own survival. So there is 
no reason for the brain to need belief and sensory data to come to the same conclusions. 
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And this is why beliefs are not always easily changed once they are adopted, even if there 
is clear evidence to contradict them. The brain protects beliefs as a survival 
mechanism.209   
 This is even true for beliefs that do not pertain to danger. The reason people cling 
to seemingly trivial beliefs are because beliefs are all interconnected in the brain, together 
creating a person’s perception of the world. This provides a stable perception of the 
world, so survival is understood if that system remains together and unchallenged. Even 
if an unimportant belief is challenged, the entire system of belief in the brain, including 
those important to survival, perceives a threat. Lester cited creationists as an example, 
explaining why they cannot deal with believing evolutionary data: because doing so 
challenges the rest of their beliefs, and the sense of survival that the brain needs.210  
 So when availability cascades create widespread beliefs throughout a group of 
people, for the majority of those individuals beliefs stick. It is a challenge for people to 
change those beliefs because they are now tied to the survival mechanism of belief in the 
brain. The real problem arises when availability cascades produce availability errors, 
spreading incorrect information as fact and solidifying it as belief. This is why 
availability cascades cannot be easily undone.  
 Even if the correct version of a fact were spread after the incorrect one, it would 
then be challenging to people’s belief of the incorrect fact. This was the case during the 
2000 presidential election. Even though it was factually clear Bush had incorrectly been 
proclaimed the winner of the election, with all major news channels pulling their late 
night calls the next day, the persistent belief was that Bush had won. There was no way to 
effectively reverse the influence from the previous night. 
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 The same is true for the Iraq War availability cascade, though to an even greater 
extent. Warnings about Iraq were more potent because the message spread by the Bush 
administration presented a direct threat to personal survival. Imagery of destruction and 
the possibility of an attack on American soil were raised constantly, and people believed 
it. Years later, even after a link between Iraq and al Qaeda had been disproven and no 
weapons of mass destruction were found, people still believed that these false claims 
were true.211 If a message being spread by an availability cascade is a direct threat to 
survival, then the belief it causes will be extremely difficult to change if it turns out to be 
false.  
 Television as a medium adds to the potency of belief creation. In subtle but 
powerful ways, availability cascades on television are even more persuasive than print. 
The basis of this is the recognition that television news is extremely similar to a genuine 
human interaction, much more than newspapers, radio, or the Internet. Physiological 
studies focused on people’s interaction with television news found this to be the case. 
Brian Mullen published one of the better-known studies in 1986. He examined how 
newscaster’s faces could exhibit a bias towards a political candidate in the viewers mind. 
Mullen found bias was possible, identifying certain newscasters as being more supportive 
of certain candidates than others, by smiling while reporting on them. This occurred 
regardless of the content of their reports.212 Newscaster bias was also exhibited in voting 
patterns of the viewers, suggesting that there exists more than simply bias, but actionable 
positive encouragement.213  In his conclusions, Mullen identified this potential and 
suggested that there existed in television news the “possibility of a subtle, peripheral type 
of persuasion.”214  
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 Diana Mutz, a PhD at Stanford University who researched public opinion, 
political psychology and mass political behavior, identified and expanded on the 
persuasiveness of television in terms of its affect on citizens participating in a democratic 
government. Television was the focus of her research because it was the primary way in 
which Americans obtain information and differing perspectives on politics.215 One of the 
features of this habit is the presentation of news in a way that drama and conflict are 
emphasized, due to the increased entertainment value they provide.216 Increased 
entertainment, of course, attracts viewers, but does not take into account the effect on 
civic discourse. One way in which television news has become more entertaining and 
dramatic is the increasing amount of close up facial shots.217  
 Because cameras can zoom in without being unobtrusive, television pundits have 
literally become “talking heads,” taking up much of the screen. A face-to-face interaction 
is simulated for the viewer, the majority of the time with individuals they have never met 
and would not ordinarily be close to. The physical distance between people is a defining 
aspect of human interaction; people will respond in varying ways to social interaction 
because of it.218 Being closer to anything, positive or negative, will cause more intense 
emotional reactions than if distance is present.219 Being in close proximity to something 
also elicits a much more intense judgment, positive or negative, based on the emotional 
reaction.220 Shows that feature a majority of close up shots illicit a stronger reaction in 
people because they increase the perceived closeness to others, visually violating the 
personal space of the viewer.221   
 People’s increased emotional reaction to television does not happen on purpose. It 
is a natural subconscious response. So when a host is shown being disagreeable on a 
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news show with close camera shots, viewers who do not agree with them are more likely 
to have a negative “gut reaction” to the person with opposing views. This occurs because 
the disagreeable person is shown in a way that simulates a very close interaction with the 
viewer, and hence increases the determined negative response. Viewers unconsciously 
make these judgments.222 
 So when it comes to shows about politics, usually a dull topic, it is no surprise 
that conflict and tight shots of people disagreeing are relied upon to increase 
entertainment. They are more dramatic because of the emotional reaction—good or 
bad—and therefore more entertaining.223 This is exactly how CNN’s Crossfire was setup, 
to promote disagreements between political ideologies that would provoke emotional 
responses for an entertaining viewing experience. Jon Stewart argued Crossfire was 
“hurting America,” and it was. Because emotion infused programming about politics 
actually harms the political discourse.  
 Mutz’s research showed that civility is the crucial factor in political televisions’ 
influence. Through her studies she found that when people are presented with opposing 
viewpoints in a civil manner on television, legitimacy of that view is actually increased in 
the viewers eyes. However, when opposing views are shown with an uncivil air, viewers 
find the opposing viewpoint less legitimate.224 Showing uncivil presenters with close up 
shots that hold differing opinions are even more likely to cause dismissal of the opposing 
ideas in viewers.225 The problem that this breeds, essentially Stewart’s claim that 
Crossfire and shows like it were hurting America, is the delegitimizing of differing 
opinions on policy and government. Both conservatives and liberals must to work 
together to make decisions for the country. But if people view differing opinions as 
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illegitimate, then there is no incentive to work with people that hold those opinions. 
Democracy cannot function if opposing sides of the political spectrum categorically 
reject differing viewpoints, but the majority of political television does not encourage 
virtual mutual respect among political differences.  
 24-Hour television news is at the heart of these psychological phenomena. It is a 
mass medium that reaches hundreds of millions of people, passing on information that 
can be true or false. People react strongly in subconscious ways to news presented on 
television because it simulates human interaction and fosters subconscious emotion. Mass 
availably of news can create strong beliefs, again either true of false, which are not easily 
changed. And because 24-hour television news is so widespread, even those who do not 
watch are influenced by people that do. 
 The Daily Show was important precisely because of television’s power. Jon 
Stewart critiqued 24-hour news in the same television medium it is presented in. Short 
clips of literally ridiculous things that occur during 24-hour news broadcasts were often 
played because they are humorous. But it was more than simply for laughs when The 
Daily Show did this. It was a satirical critique of the usual practices of the news. And by 
removing clips from their original emotional context, which is often over urgent and 
overdramatic, the actual content of what people saying was made clear. The emotional 
power of televisions’ simulated human interaction was diminished when this occurs, 
because the emotional narrative was interrupted.  
 Often what is said in these clips simply doesn’t make sense outside of its 
emotional context, and The Daily Show presents this extremely well. That is why The 
Daily Show was an extremely effective critique of 24-hour news. It is crucial to 
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acknowledge the service it did by emphasizing the logical disconnect of emotional 24-
hour programming. Humor, in effect, became the new emotional response. What makes 
The Daily Show effective as a balance ironically is the same reason that 24-hour news is 
effective in drawing viewers: the emotional power of television. It is the same power that 
changed the outcome of an American election; and it has also changed the balance of 
power between the three branches of American government in terms of creating and 
implementing policy.  
 
 
4. The President Has No Clothes  
  
 The Bush administration used 24-hour news, along with other outlets, to convince 
a large segment of the American population to support radical foreign policy goals. Their 
success in achieving their desired outcome stemmed from an increased power of the 
executive branch and its ability to effectively use the 24-hour news cycle to gain an 
advantage in quickly shaping policy. This represents a major change from the past in the 
balance and function of the American government. The change happened accidentally, 
without consent from the people the government represents. Presidents have taken an 
ever larger role in the policymaking process in the last half-century, sometimes even 
leading the formation of policy.226 24-hour news greatly contributed to that change in the 
past ten years. 
 Political thinker Andrew Bacevich identified the trend if increasing executive 
branch influence in his work On the Limits of Power. He cited the beginning of this shift 
as rooted in large national security crises since the 1940’s, the two major examples being 
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World War II and the Cold War. Both of these conflicts required centralization within the 
federal government and especially the United States Presidency, so that international 
threats could be met with a united country an a quick response from the Commander in 
Chief.227  
 Bacevich combined the increased influence of the President with the American 
feeling of moral duty towards the rest of the world into an idea he describes as the 
“imperial Presidency.” Because America sees itself as a great good in the world that 
inevitably must defeat evil, he argued, every action deemed necessary to promote 
American good has a convenient justification. This includes military interventions like 
Iraq. But Bacevich was clear that the Bush administration was not the first to do this, they 
just did it on an even greater scale than before.228 
 What gave the ability to centralize executive power and expand the policy of 
military interventions by invading preemptively to the Bush administration was 24-hour 
news. They repeated what the president and other officials said without fact checking, 
quieted dissenting opinions in a patriotic time for economic reasons, and neglected their 
journalistic duty in background checking administration media operatives. An additional 
way 24-hour news helped president Bush achieve policy goals stems from the fact that 
the president can take advantage of the 24-hour news cycle. Because the president 
centrally controls the executive branch it can advocate for unified policies with its 
combined influence. The executive branch can use 24-hour news to promote the policies 
it chooses.229 Congress, by its very nature, cannot use 24-hour news in a concerted effort 
to the same degree as the executive. Legislation creation requires compromise between 
different ideas, so the entire legislative branch cannot advocate for a single policy.  
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 24-Hour news used as a platform for advocating policy is exactly what occurred 
during the lead up to the Iraq War; Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell and Rice all 
advocated for a singular policy with established talking points echoed throughout the 24-
hour news cycle and dictate coverage in other mediums. They used military analysts 
through the Department of Defense to repeat talking points as well. The survival threat 
Iraq supposedly posed increased the potency of the administration’s message, both within 
the media and in people’s minds. When patriotism flourished after 9/11, conditions were 
perfect for convincing Americans to support preemptive invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
Under different circumstances, convincing the American public to support this radical 
policy would have been nearly impossible. Timing was everything, and 24-hour news 
made that timing possible. 24-Hour news ultimately interfered with the creation of 
American policy.  
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FOUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
De Tocqueville’s Reef 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To Alexis de Tocqueville the United States truly was an amazing example of 
representative government at work. Amidst the quirks and occasional missteps of society, 
he viewed America as an inspiration for other democratic nations. But de Tocqueville 
also recognized the possibility that the young American democracy could succumb to a 
“dangerous phase in the life of democratic nations”: 
 
 When the taste for physical pleasures in such a nation grows more 
speedily than education or the habit of liberty, a time occurs when men are 
carried away and lose self-control at the sight of the new possessions they 
are ready to grasp. Intent only on getting rich, they fail to perceive the 
close link between their own private fortunes and general prosperity. 
There is no need to wrench their rights from such citizens; they let them 
slip voluntarily through their fingers. The exercise of their political duties 
seems to them a tiresome nuisance which diverts them from industry. 
When they are required to elect their representatives, to offer help in 
government, to share in the business of the community, they have no time; 
the could not possibly waste such valuable time on futile work which is 
the pastime for idlers and quite unsuitable for important men busy with the 
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serious concerns of life. Such people think they are following the doctrine 
of self-interest but their conception of that theory is crude and, in their aim 
to look after what they call their business, they neglect the chief concern 
which is to retain self-control.230 
 
The warning stems from one of de Tocqueville’s preoccupations: the interplay between 
democracy and the individual. The more individuals in a democracy who follow personal 
goals at the expense of public service and public concerns, the easier for them to lose 
political rights. This ultimately leads to a degrading of rights for all citizens. “If a clever 
and ambitious man happens to seize power at such a critical moment,” de Tocqueville 
wrote, “he discovers an open path to any encroachment.”231 Neglect of public concerns 
will ultimately undermine private ones.  
 In de Tocqueville’s time, such predictions remained a far-off possibility, with no 
immediate prospect of occurrence. “Up to now,” de Tocqueville concluded, “the 
Americans have happily avoided all the reefs I have just charted and one must really 
admire them for that.”232 But over 150 years later, America appears caught on de 
Tocqueville’s reef.  
 Those who prefer an emphasis on entertainment in news media outnumber 
citizens who value hard news about politics and government. Hamilton’s economic 
model of the news illustrates this fact, where the driving force behind news media is 
achieving the greatest possible numbers of viewers. If the majority of American citizens 
cared about the nuances of day-to-day political news, then media companies might have 
incentives to provide civic-minded news products to a receptive market. But the case is 
just the opposite, and the majority of news programming on 24-hour networks and other 
outlets do not positively contribute to civil discourse in America. 
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 News organizations such as CNN, MSNBC, FOX News, and others cannot be 
excluded from fault simply because ordinary citizens decline to follow politics. These 
organizations are made up of citizens as well, people who have also chosen to neglect 
civic duties in order to make as much profit as possible. By overwhelmingly providing 
media that emphasizes entertainment instead of political discourse, such organizations do 
not let new viewers choose what they want, limiting the possibilities for new media 
habits. These networks also misleadingly claim programs are civil discourse or important 
news when they are designed to be entertaining before anything else, such as with 
Crossfire. This lack of genuine presentation also includes claims of objectivity; perfect 
objectivity realistically cannot exist, but assumptions fostered by network’s claims of 
such reporting lead to a by-definition invalidation of all other “objective” news sources 
that present differing views.  
 Ultimately it is an ever-continuing cycle that promotes entertainment ahead of 
political involvement, all based on economic incentives. The decisions by major news 
networks to do so led to major shifts in American society and an altering of the course of 
American history.  
 
 
1. History, Changed 
  
 24-Hour television news contributed greatly to the shift in the American society’s 
emphasis on entertainment rather than information in news. But there is another way in 
which CNN, FOX News, MSNBC, have changed America: through direct interference 
with the United States government. 24-Hour news influenced the outcome of a major 
 102 
American presidential election in 2000 and aided in broadening the public’s perception of 
the need for the radical American policy of preemptive invasion in Iraq. Because of their 
broad influence over the public sphere, these organizations have a de facto responsibility 
to the American people, which they neglected in these three instances.  
 During the 2000 presidential election, 24-hour television news networks raced to 
report election results long before votes were counted, or in one instance concluded. With 
millions of Americans watching they gave a final call on the election that was incorrect. 
George W. Bush was proclaimed the winner, and Al Gore was cast as an ungrateful 
looser in the following court battle. Gore would not recover from this perception, despite 
the fact that he and Bush were technically on equal footing in terms of the election. 
Neither of them should have been announced a winner before the mandatory recounts had 
finished. By misreporting these results, 24-hour news influenced a majored presidential 
election, interfering with the right of the American people to self-elect their government.  
 In the lead up to the Iraq War, and during the subsequent occupation of Iraq, 24-
hour news networks did not question the presentation of the Bush Administration’s 
radical foreign policy of preemptive invasion. The concerted effort by administration 
officials to influence the media succeeded due to 24-hour news networks reluctance to 
risk viewership by going against official administration policies and the lack of incentive 
to use monetary resources to investigate the claims. As a result, the widespread and 
factually incorrect belief of an Iraqi threat to American security came to be. Thousands of 
American soldiers, and tens of thousands of Iraqis ended up loosing their lives as a result. 
Once the occupation of Iraq began to come unraveled, and legitimate concerns raised by 
retired generals were voiced, the Bush administration once again effectively used 24-hour 
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news to support their own policies. Networks did not properly research analysts’ 
backgrounds and possible motives, and thus biased information was spread under the 
guise of independent analysis. As a result, the American people supported a policy based 
on beliefs that were not true. American government policy, the reflection of the American 
people’s will for government actions—the very reason for democracy—was shaped by 
the reporting, or lack thereof, of 24-hour news.  
 These moments show, unequivocally, that the 24-hour news medium, through the 
networks CNN, FOX News, and MSNBC, truly altered the course of American history. It 
is impossible to say what outcomes could have been, but whatever the case, 24-hour 
television news affected the history of the United States in these instances.  
 Commercial media has abetted the decline of popular influence in government, 
instead giving that power to those wise enough to abuse the faults of 24-hour news, or 
simply just letting miscalculations decide the fate of the nation. This is a shift from how 
the United States government is intended to function. If it is to be the new norm, the 
American people must approve it. But it is doubtful that a majority of American citizens 
would choose for 24-hour news to have such influence. Instead, as de Tocqueville 
warned, a lack of involvement by American people has truly led to a usurping of political 
influence of the individual citizen.  
  
 
2. Television’s Power 
  
 24-Hour television news stands as a preeminent influence in three ways: its broad 
audience, the sheer hours of programming, and its persuasiveness. These factors make 
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24-hour television news more powerful as a news outlet than newspapers, radio, or the 
Internet. This is not because the content is different from these other sources; it is the 
very nature of the television medium.  
 The wide audience of 24-hour television news channels CNN, FOX News, 
MSNBC, combined with the sheer amount of content that they broadcast, make them a 
near perfect vehicle for magnifying the dissemination of information through availability 
cascades. The important aspect about availability cascades, however, is not just that 
information becomes widespread through official channels, but also from person to 
person. Not every American watches cable news, yet they are readily exposed to 
information from it through other people. This human-to-human interaction is what 
makes availability cascades even more potent.  
 Availability cascades per se are less the problem than incorrect or misleading 
information spread in them. Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, who identified the 
availability cascade, contended the phenomena can, “create a danger that apparently 
democratic outcomes will rest on misinformation and be unrepresentative, in any 
normatively attractive sense, of citizens' actual beliefs, desires, and judgments.”233 They 
went on to suggest that while availability cascades are not a recent development, they 
have become more potent in the current day’s informational speed. They said that, 
“modern communications enable them to gather momentum and overwhelm governments 
far more rapidly than was possible in the past.”234 The 2000 presidential election and the 
Iraq War are examples where the speed of 24-hour news, the most potent of these 
“modern communications,” interfered with democratic systems and the nations economy.  
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 24-Hour news is the most potent modern communication because it is the closest 
simulation of human interaction available.235 As studies by both Brian Mullen and Diana 
Mutz showed, there exist subtle but powerful nuances that affect TV viewers. Simply 
smiling while saying something subconsciously biases the content presented. And 
decisions made by program creators on how close to zoom during political debates had a 
great affect as well. The closer someone on TV appears visually to the viewer, the more 
emotional involvement they get from the experience. And a negative emotional 
experience can generate extreme biases against content. Emotionally driven news 
programming defines 24-hour news. This emotional heavy outlet is also on all of the 
time, so at literally any point of the day people could access this experience.  
 Thus 24-hour news offers confirmation for strong adherence to beliefs, 
sometimes-incorrect ones. Once those beliefs have been created, they are challenging to 
change. The examples chronicled in this essay illustrate how the television medium 
spread incorrect information and entrenched beliefs. This is how 24-hour news networks 
changed the course of American history.  
 
 
3. The Daily Show  
  
 The Daily Show’s importance lies in its critical response to 24-hour television 
news. The show critiqued news media for avoiding its intended civic purpose. Since the 
show was foremost a comedy show, intended to make people laugh, it critiqued the 
established networks at no risk to advertising revenue. And because it denied any claim 
to be news, it did not shirk any journalistic responsibility. Jon Stewart became a media 
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force over the first ten years of The Daily Show’s existence. A Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press poll found in 2008 he was the fourth most admired journalist out 
of American reporters. This tied him, a fake news journalist, with legitimate newsmen 
Brian Williams, Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather and Anderson Cooper.236  
 Other programs in the news media also copied the program’s style of showing 
politicians contradicting themselves with different video clips.237 This is what made The 
Daily Show important to an examination of 24-hour news. Because the medium of 
television is so powerful, the most powerful response to inaccuracies on 24-hour news 
must come in the same medium. The Daily Show does this. It helped expose not only the 
factual inaccuracies, but also the over emotionalized nature of 24-hour news. It took clips 
out of their original emotional context to focus on what is actually being said, instead of 
what the viewer felt was happening. That is the true reason The Daily Show was such an 
effective counterbalance to 24-hour television news.  
 In addition to these conclusions, The Project for Excellence in Journalism studied 
the Daily Show in 2007 and found that it could legitimately be called more than comedy. 
The report said that sometimes, “In its choice of topics, its use of news footage to 
deconstruct the manipulations by public figures and its tendency toward pointed satire 
over playing just for laughs, The Daily Show performs a function that is close to 
journalistic in nature—getting people to think critically about the public square.”238 It 
also found The Daily Show was as popular, if not more so, that other television news 
shows like the popular O’Reilly Factor on FOX News.  
 The report concluded The Daily Show was “journalistic” and that it was, “highly 
focused on the public square, on issues of significance, particularly those focused around 
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Washington.” “The Daily Show is no doubt entertainment,” it continued, “but it is 
entertainment, measurably, with a substantive point.” Ultimately the report found The 
Daily Show was “clearly impacting the American dialogue.”239 The show was truly one 
of the most effective, institutional ways to counterbalance negative aspects of 24-hour 
television news. But there are also important ways tin which every citizen must also 
counterbalance its negative effects.  
 
 
4. What Must Be Done  
  
 Seeing examples of the enormity of the problems caused by 24-news gives the 
appearance that individuals can have little affect on news channel choices. But the true 
influence of 24-hour news channels stems from causing availability cascades of 
information. The speed and breadth of availability cascades can be reduced simply if 
fewer people react to them. Kuran and Sunstein suggested that if people understand 
availability cascades and how they occur, people will be less likely to become part of the 
cascade itself. The knowledge also comes with the understanding that validity of 
information does not necessarily respond to how many people believe it.240 This study’s 
exploration of 24-hour news and America clearly shows these problems, hopefully 
creating understanding an of availability cascades that will stifle their influence.   
 There is also a broader change that must happen on an individual level. American 
citizens must once again care about the political process. People must become active in 
the government, in self-rule. Benjamin Barber argued “The victory of consumers is not 
synonymous with the victory of citizens,” a claim that highlights the detriment of 
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following economic goals fostered by politically apathetic consumers and profit seeking 
networks.241 The point is both of these groups are made up American citizens. And 
therefore news organizations and news consumers both have a civic responsibility. Every 
American will be worse off if news outlet owners seek only profit and viewers seek only 
entertainment, if we all follow these personal interests. There must be a balance between 
the individual citizens and the collective group—the United States. It must be understood 
that freedom comes with responsibility, for citizens and press. Achieving this balance is 
the only way representative government—democracy—will continue to succeed.  
 Only when we strike this balance will America have freed itself from de 
Tocqueville’s reef. It is up to American citizens, each and every one of us, to ultimately 
make this happen.    
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